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This article examines the legal status and rights of undocu-

mented workers under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).

The author analyzes legislative policy and judicial decisions dealing with aliens and concludes that undocumented workers are
within the coverage of the NLRA. The author next addresses the
question of a possible antinomy between federal labor and immigration law, but concludes that the two bodies of law are consonant. Even if an antinomy exists, the author believes the principles
of accommodation support protection of undocumented aliens
under the NLRA. Finally, the article addresses the complicated
problems involved in formulating appropriate remedies for undocumented workers when unfair labor practices occur.

With the re-emergence of illegal immigration from Mexico1 to the
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1. The undocumented immigrant population in the United States is composed of
diverse groups with distinct demographic, historical, and economic characteristics. The
dissimilarity within these national groups renders any generalized socio-historical discussion futile. Consequently, this article, in its socio-historical analysis, focuses on Mexican
undocumented immigration for numerous reasons. First, Mexican workers have a long
history of legal and illegal work-related migration to the United States. Second, the geographical proximity of Mexico has created unique migration patterns. For example,
Mexican-origin immigrants constitute the largest national component of the undocumented population. Third, it has been argued that laws and administrative policies regulating Mexican immigration have differed significantly from those imposed on other naDecember 1983 Vol. 21 No. 1

United States in the late sixties, "illegal aliens" '2 have once again
become the source of serious social and political concern. Because
this migration is fundamentally a movement of labor, it is not surprising that concern has been generated over the impact of undocumented workers on the United States labor market. Consistent with
past political practices during recessionary times, undocumented persons are currently blamed for the high rate of unemployment and
are accused of depressing wages and working conditions.3 Ironically,
organizing efforts by undocumented workers to improve wages and
working conditions, often in combination with native workers, are
frequently frustrated by employer manipulation of the ambiguities in
labor law and the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS)
enforcement policy. The ambivalent extra-legal status of these workers often obfuscates their rights under the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA),4 frequently to the benefit of their employers. Consequently, an analysis of their precise status and protection under lationalities and make up a pattern of their own. On this latter point see Cardenas, United
States Immigration Policy Toward Mexico: An HistoricalPerspective, 2 CHICANo L.
REv. 66 (1975).
2. The term "illegal alien" is rejected as a proper term for persons present in the
United States without proper authority. While the term is objectionable because of its
unwarranted connotations of criminality, this article oppugns the use of the term on explicitly legal grounds. The term "illegal alien" is not found in the text of United States
immigration law, and it bears no rational relationship to the categories of immigrants
created by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) or its attending regulations. Immigration and Nationality Act, §§ 101-250, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1260 (1982); 8
C.F.R. §§ 1.1-499.1 (1983). Instead, a person's legal authority to retain residence in the
United States is determined by the deportation statutes and related regulations. Brief for
Appellees at 1 n.1, Texas v. Undocumented Alien Children, No. 80-1934 (Texas was
consolidated with Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)). Since the INA contains various
provisions allowing for the suspension of deportation, the issue of deportability goes beyond the legality of the persons's entry. See Mitang, Alternatives To Deportation: Relief
Provisionsof the Immigrationand NationalityAct, 8 U.C.D. L. REv. 323 (1975). Until
a competent magistrate determines that a person is deportable, the person retains the
right to continue residing in the United States. Accordingly, the court in Fed'n for Am.
Immigration Reform v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564, 573 n.12 (D.D.C. 1980), appeal
dismissed, 447 U.S. 916 (1980), affd mem., No. 80-1246 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 6, 1980), cert.
denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3710 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1981) (No. 80-975) recognized that:
[T]he very concept of "illegal alien" amounts only to a vague notion of a person
who might be deported if his or her presence were known to the authorities. But
the determination of that legal fact can be a complicated process, as our numerous cases involving attempts by the INS to deport residents of this country
demonstrate. The Immigration & Nationality Act is long and complex, full of
provisos and exceptions.
3. See, e.g., Welfare System a Havenfor Illegal Aliens, Chi. Trib., Apr. 12, 1981,
at 16, col. 1; Drain By Illegal Aliens on Welfare Claimed, Hous. Chron., Oct. 11, 1982,
at 4, col. 1; Experts See More Job Woes ifImmigration Bill Fails, Hous. Chron., Dec.
8, 1982, at 8, col. 1.
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The NLRA was amended by
the Labor Management Relations Act, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). The NLRA was also
amended by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No.
86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
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bor law doctrine and immigration law is essential to any effort to
improve the terms of employment and working conditions of both
domestic and undocumented workers.
This article analyzes the status of undocumented workers under
the NLRA. The discussion commences with an assessment of the
evolving relationship between Mexican undocumented workers and
American trade unions, and includes a survey of demographic, sociological, and labor market attributes of the contemporary migration
flow. The analysis proceeds to an examination of the INS' practice
of policing undocumented workers at the jobsite. This brief exposition will focus on how INS factory raids have been manipulated by
employers to thwart organizing campaigns. The substance of the article will concern itself with a legal investigation of specific NLRA
provisions as they relate to undocumented workers. The threshold
question of whether the undocumented worker is an "employee"
within the definition of the NLRA is analyzed. Also examined under
extant law is the question of whether employer disclosures of illegal
immigration status to the INS, resulting in interference with concerted activity, constitutes an unfair labor practice. Finally, the
problems involved in fashioning appropriate labor law remedies for
workers with extra-legal status are explored.
TRADE UNIONS AND SocIo-DEMOGRAPHIC IMPACT: AN OVERVIEW

Participants in the illegal migration flow from Mexico are deemed
a "social problem" because of the widely-held belief that they have
an adverse economic and social effect on United States society. The
primary untoward results of undocumented immigration are said to
be: (1) the displacement of native workers, (2) the depressing of
wages and working conditions, and (3) the draining of public assistance funds. 5 Many argue that these, and myriad other social
problems, are exacerbated by an undocumented population number5. The Simpson-Mazzoli bill is the most prominent proposed legislation premised
on these concerns. The bill was introduced in 1982 as the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982, S. 2222, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.; H.R. 6514, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. For a
summary of the bill see H.R. REP. No. 890 (pt. 1), 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). S. 2222
passed in the Senate, but H.R. 6514 did not pass in the House of Representatives. See
Hous. Chron., July 20, 1983, at 3, col. 2. The bill was reintroduced in the 98th Congress
(1983) in slightly different form as the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1983. S.
529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.; H.R. 1510, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). S. 529 passed in the
Senate, but H.R. 1510 once again has stalled in the House of Representatives. See
House Democrats Block Immigration Law Revision, Hous. Chron., Oct. 2, 1983, at 31,
col. 1.

ing in the millions, and augmented by additional millions each year.'
These allegations of negative social impact must be examined
under the critical light shed by recent economic and sociological investigations. 7 Before analyzing these accusations, however, the historical relationship and current developments between the United
States trade unions and undocumented workers will be explored.
Trade Unions and Undocumented Workers: History and Current
Developments
The genesis of the trade union movement in the United States can
be traced back to the inception of massive Southern and Eastern European migration in the 1870's.1 During the early years of the labor
movement, immigrants were assailed for organizing unions which
were considered inimical to the American "way of life." Paradoxically, by the turn of the century, immigrants were being criticized
for not joining unions and were blamed for the harsh living and
working conditions of the time. 9 Some evidence suggests that in the
late nineteenth century employers devised a conscious plan to recruit
immigrant labor as a means of undermining the incipient organizing
efforts of domestic workers. Employers pitted "new" immigrant labor against "old" immigrant labor, by blaming low wages and poor
working conditions on the newly arrived immigrants."0 The American Federation of Labor (AFL), with its focus on organizing skilled
labor, appears to have readily accepted the employers' rationale. The
AFL adopted the stance that "new" immigrants could not be organ6. See generally Chapman, A Look at Illegal Immigration Causes and Impact on
the United States, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 34 (1975). The author, a former commissioner
of the INS, speculates on the negative social consequences of the "increasing" undocumented person population.
7. The highly disjointed and tendentious nature of much of the research on immigration makes my selection of sources critical. My analysis will rely primarily on the
following sources because these works constitute some of the most current and extensive
treatments on the subject: D. NORTH & M. HOUSTOUN, THE CHARACTERISTICS AND
ROLE OF ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE U.S. LABOR MARKET: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY

(1976); M. VILLALPANDO, A STUDY OF THE SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACT OF ILLEGAL
ALIENS ON THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO (1977); W. CORNELIUS, MEXICAN MIGRATION
TO THE UNITED STATES: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES AND U.S. RESPONSES (1978).
8. See I. HOURWICH, IMMIGRATION AND LABOR 30-31 (1912) (during the first
decade of the new migration, 1880-1890, more labor unions were organized than
throughout the previous history of the United States).
9. Bustamante, The Historical Context of Undocumented Mexican Immigration
to the United States, 3 AZTLAN 261, 265 (1972). This article uses a comparative analysis, placing Mexican immigration in the context of general United States immigration
history, and thereby simultaneously identifying ideological, social, and economic elements
common to all immigrant groups, and constraining structural features peculiar to Mexican workers.
10. For an excellent historical analysis of the organizing efforts by immigrants see
Lopez, Undocumented Mexican Migration: In Search of A Just Immigration Law and
Policy, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 615, 641-672 (1981).
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ized and were therefore causing the abject conditions facing the
United States working class."
The United States labor movement has applied this position to
Mexican immigrants. It has held steadfast to the notion that the
Mexican worker (irrespective of legal status) is so tractable and supine as to be virtually unorganizable. From this premise organized
labor has labeled the Mexican worker a "menace to American labor" 12 and has incessantly called for his deportation. AFL leaders
were in the forefront of restrictionist campaigns in the 1930's and
were among the most vocal proponents of the Mexican "repatria-

tion" efforts of 1920-21 and the 1930's.13
The enmity felt by the trade union movement toward Mexican
workers manifested itself in their exclusion from union membership.
This exclusion was sometimes effected by requiring Mexican workers
to become United States citizens before they were allowed to join. 4
The hostility of the United States trade union movement continues

to the present and statements condemning undocumented workers as
the bane of native workers are still standard fare at the AFL-CIO
conventions.
This stereotypic conception of Mexican "docility" runs contrary to
historical research documenting Mexican labor militancy. As early
as 1903, Mexican workers led major campaigns including the 1903
11. The attitude of the AFL has been described as follows:
The A. F. of L. leaders were hardly interested in organizing these newly arrived
immigrants; they adopted the attitude that it was best for the Federation "to
permit the newcomers to sink or swim by themselves." At the same time, they
advanced the thesis that they could not be organized; unlike the "old" immigrants, they were "a heterogeneous stew of divergent and discordant customs,
languages, institutions; and they were impossible to assimilate or unionize."
They cut wages because they were satisfied with conditions that neither the native American workers nor the "older" immigrants would tolerate. They came
not to settle permanently, to take root in America, but to earn a few dollars,
primarily through strikebreaking, and return home.
3 P. FONER, HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 258 (1964),
cited in Lopez, supra note 10, at 647 n.166.
12. See M. REISLER, BY THE SWEAT OF THEIR BROW 68 (1976). This attitude of
organized labor persists today. One study indicajes that 72% of union leaders believe that
undocumented workers "take Americans' jobs." Hous. Chron., Nov. 17, 1982, at 4, col.
1.
13. See A. HOFFMAN, UNWANTED MEXICAN AMERICANS IN THE GREAT DEPRESSION

29-30 (1974) (an excellent treatment of the mass deportations of the late twenties

and early thirties).
14. As early as 1921, the AFL used citizenship requirements as a discriminatory
tactic. For a general discussion of the AFL position with regard to Mexican immigration
of the 1920's see Levenstein, The AFL and Mexican Immigration in the 1920's: An
Experiment in Labor Diplomacy, 48 HISPANIC AM. HIST. REV. 206 (1968).

Pacific Electric Railroad strike in Los Angeles and the Clifton-Morenci miners strike in Arizona. 5 Chicano and Mexicano1 6 workers
have well-documented participation in strike activity throughout the
1900's leading up to the present. Social investigators have noted that
Mexican workers readily join unions when urged to do so and, in
various instances, they have even mounted organizing campaigns on
their own.17
Recent empirical research on union participation by Mexican undocumented workers also appears to contradict the longstanding
AFL-CIO position that these workers are unorganizable. Social research discloses that approximately ten percent of all undocumented
workers in the United States are union members.18 This percentage
is high considering the general economic vulnerability of all workers
and, particularly in the case of undocumented workers, the very real
potential of deportation. Nevertheless, the membership rate could be
even higher if undocumented workers were not ignored or excluded
by labor organizations. In Los Angeles, for example, where some unions are making an effort to organize these workers, informal evidence reveals that approximately thirty percent of all undocumented
workers belong to unions.19 This estrangement between the American labor movement and the Mexican worker may be ending given
the following factors: 1) the organized portion of the labor force has
dropped from forty percent thirty years ago, to below twenty-four
percent at present, and thus the undocumented worker is viewed as a
reserve of untapped labor; 2) the undocumented worker's presence in
certain economic sectors (i.e., needle trades, restaurants, farm labor)
is so pervasive that the very existence of unions in these sectors requires that they organize the foreign worker; and 3) undocumented
workers often perceived unions as the only safe civil institution that

15. See Wollenberg, Working on El Traque: The Pacific Electric Strike of 1903,

in THE CHICANO 96 (M. Hundley ed. 1975). See also Gomez-Quinones, The FirstSteps:
Chicano Labor Conflict and Organizing, 1900-1920, 3 AZTLAN 13, 26-35 (1973).
16. The term "Chicano" refers to persons of Mexican origin who reside permanently in the United States and is thus synonymous with "Mexican American." The term
"Mexican" or "Mexicano" when used to refer to persons in the Southwest, means persons from Mexico who are in the United States temporarily or on an irregular status.
Legal, social, and historical complexities preclude the drawing of a glaring line between
the two. Unless otherwise specified, "Chicano" will refer to both groups. See M. BAR-

4 (1979).
supra note 7, at 71-74.

RERA, RACE AND CLASS IN THE SOUTHWEST

17. W.

CORNELIUS,

18. Id. at 71. In commenting on this percentage, Cornelius states that "during the
past 57 years 'Big Labor' in the United States seems to have done everything within its
power to alienate Mexican workers. That even nine or ten percent of them have joined
United States unions is remarkable, given the indifference or hostility of most union leaders." Id. at 74.

19. R. Louv,

THE MEXICAN MIGRATION: SOUTHWIND

a series of articles for The San Diego Union).

59 (1980) (compilation of
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can help them fight specific workplace abuses. 20 Illustrative of a po-

tential shift in trade union policy are the successful attempts at organizing undocumented workers by the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, the United Farm Workers' Union, and the
International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union.2"
The increasing unionization of undocumented workers has the potential of significantly altering the terms of the current "illegal
alien" debate. 22 The unionization of undocumented workers could
limit the exploitation of these workers and protect their labor and
immigration rights. 23 This movement could also improve conditions
for low-wage, native-born 'workers and indirectly attract more domestic workers to the unskilled labor market. Its most fundamental
impact, however, is that unionization could decrease the pull of undocumented labor into the United States because these workers
could command wages equivalent to those paid domestic workers,
thus eliminating the incentive for employers to hire them.
When efforts to organize undocumented workers materialize, novel
legal questions will be placed before the NLRB. Employers will no
doubt resist such efforts because the economic and political vulnerability of the "illegal" is exactly what makes him attractive as a laborer. Amid this clash of economic interests the NLRB will be petitioned to stake out new legal terrain, and the rights accorded under
the NLRA will have to be reconciled with the immigration laws of
this country.
The Size of the Undocumented Mexican Population
Exaggerated estimates of the size of the undocumented population
in the United States have been used persistently to inflame public
20.
ban

For a general discussion of trade unions and undocumented workers in the ur-

context see NORTH AMERICAN CONGRESS ON LATIN AMERICA, UNDOCUMENTED

WORKERS IN NEW YORK CITY (1979).

21. The United Auto Workers' Union (UAW) has also been active in organizing
undocumented workers in the Southern California area. For an interesting account of an
organizing meeting held by the UAW see Louv, supra note 19, at 59-60.
22. The trend toward unionization of undocumented workers could be the most
significant development in the 1980's. The traditional arguments suggesting that these
workers depress wages and working conditions and live off the public dole can be addressed by unionization. Union representation would minimize the depression of wages
and conditions of employment and union benefit, and health plans should reduce the
already negligible use of social services.
23. The International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union has taken an affirmative
stand on the issue of protecting the immigration rights of its workers by offering legal
advice on rights, residency, and the procurement of citizenship. It also provides assistance
in deportation hearings. Wall St. J., Dec. 7, 1982, at 1, col. 5.

opinion. Shrill statements by chief government officials declaring
that thirteen million undocumented persons reside in this country
have been used to support repressive legislation and a larger INS
budget.2 4 The clandestine nature of this migration makes it impossible to estimate the number of undocumented persons with any degree of precision; nonetheless, current research on this question suggests that the undocumented population is much smaller than the
figures bandied about in the media.2 5
Perhaps the fundamental flaw in official "guess-estimates" of the
size of the undocumented population is that they fail to consider return migration. Thus, the guess that a million undocumented persons
reside in the United States in a given year is compounded by the
guess that two million more will immigrate next year. This serious
methodological error often results in absurdities. For instance, a 5.2
million estimate of permanent-resident undocumented Mexicans
would require that all 15- to 44-year-old males enumerated in the
1970 Mexican census in the six principal sending states26 of Mexico
had migrated permanently to the United States by 1975.27 All field
studies done in Mexican sending communities during the past twelve
years have found, however, that the pattern of emigration to the
United States remains predominantly temporary. In his field studies
of northeast Jalisco, Professor Cornelius found that "temporary migrants to the United States outnumbered those who settled permanently in the United States by a margin of 8 to 1, during the period
from 1930 to 1976. " 28 David Heer, researcher at the University of
Southern California, recently estimated the net annual flow of undocumented Mexican immigrants at 82,000 to 130,000 per year and
these figures may be upwardly biased.2 9

24. See generally, Cardenas, Public Data On Mexican Immigration into the

United States, in CURRENT ISSUES INSOCIAL POLICY 127 (W. Littrell, G. Sjoberg ed.
1976); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF
EXISTING STUDIES OF THE NUMBER OF ILLEGAL RESIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

(1980). The report reviews existing studies of the number of undocumented persons in
the United States and it advances population estimates based on their content.
25. See, e.g., Geyer, Illegal Aliens EndangeringU.S. Ideals, Hous. Post, Dec. 4,
1982, at 2B, col. 2 (estimating 9 to 11 million undocumented persons); Malone, Immigration:'Reform Package Gathers Set of Foes From Left, Right, Hous. Post, May 27,
1983, at 2B, col. 2 (estimating the undocumented population ranges from 2 to 12

million).
26. The majority of contemporary immigrants continue to come from the six principal sending states: Durango, Guanajuaro, Jalisco, MichoacAn, San Luis, Potosi, and
Zacatecas. H. CROSS & J. SANDOS, ACROSS THE BORDER 76-77 (1981).

27. W. CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 12.
28. Id. at 25.
29. Heer, What is the Annual Net Flow of Undocumented Mexican Immigrants to
the United States, 16 DEMOGRAPHY 417 (1979); for recent Mexican estimates of the
undocumented population see N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1980, at 3, col. 1.
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Displacement of Native Workers
The central complaint lodged against undocumented workers is
that their employment causes unemployment for native workers.
This argument has been used for many years as a criticism of immigrant workers, and its validity has rarely been challenged. There is,
however, no direct evidence of displacement caused by the employment of undocumented persons.30
Before elaborating on this contention it is important to understand
the type of job occupied by an undocumented worker. INS statistics
reflect that these workers take high-paying jobs; however, this appears to be more a function of INS enforcement tactics than a reflection of the jobs actually occupied by these workers. Independent
research into the characteristics of the undocumented workers' employment uniformly reveals that the jobs they take require little or
no technical skill; necessitate only a rudimentary command of English; involve physical, dirty, arduous tasks; offer little job security
and little or no opportunity for advancement; and are usually located
within marginal firms employing fifty or fewer workers.3 1 Hence, undocumented workers are employed in what has been termed the secondary labor market. 2
Noting that jobs occupied by undocumented persons are the least
desirable to the native worker who, even if unemployed, may have
more attractive alternatives for his sustenance, Professor Cornelius
suggests that workers cannot be displaced if they are not there.33 If
illegal immigration were causing displacement, the areas where undocumented immigrants congregate would indicate a higher unemployment rate. However, the "sunbelt" states, having the largest concentration of undocumented workers, have the lowest unemployment
rate."
Consequently, a review of all social research on the question of
displacement indicates an absence of evidence supporting its validity.
30.

W. CORNELIUS, MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS AND SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA: A SUM-

MARY OF CURRENT KNOWLEDGE 34-41 (1982).

31. W. CORNELIUS, supra note 30, at 29-34.
32. See generally M. PIORE, UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS AND UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION POLICY 1-7 (1977) (an excellent brief discussion of the secondary labor market and its role in the current migration phenomenon).
33. W. CORNELIUS, supra note 30, at 34-41.
34. See M. VILLALPANDO, supra note 7, at 62. Villalpando cites a recent INS
project as illustrative of this proposition. The INS undertook active recruitment of native
workers to fill 340 jobs opened up by the apprehension of undocumented workers. All
jobs were eventually filled, but not with native workers: "90% of the positions were occupied by commuter workers from Baja California, Mexico." Id.

Even in the border area, where North and Houstoun suggest that
undocumented workers may be having an adverse economic impact, 35 'later research by Professor Gilbert Cardenas of Pan American University found that "there is no conclusive evidence that undocumented aliens have an impact on the border labor markets.""6
Arguments that blame the undocumented worker for high unemployment rates are speculative and unsupported by current social
research.
Depressing Wages and Working Conditions
A corollary of the job displacement thesis is the allegation that
employment of undocumented persons depresses wages and causes
poor working conditions. This contention has not been substantiated,
and is weakened by results from studies reflecting that a relatively
small portion of undocumented persons receive less than minimum
wage. 7 Their employment does not appear to depress wages below
the legal minimum to any great extent. Furthermore, the Cornelius
study observed that undocumented persons are usually employed in
small marginal firms and industries where the exploitation of undocumented labor is a financial modus operandi. Cornelius argues,
therefore, that the removal of undocumented persons does not necessarily translate into more jobs or better working conditions for the
native worker because these businesses may have no other alternatives available. 88
If undocumented workers were removed, wages and working conditions would not necessarily be improved. The obvious alternatives
open to a business are mechanization or, if it is unable to secure
labor at prevailing wages and conditions, the business may simply
cease to exist. Ironically, the removal of undocumented workers
would probably result in the loss of employment by native workers.
An editorial in The Wall Street Journalechoed this concern when it
stated: "In a city like New York, which has been driving away business through high costs, the illegal may well be providing the margin
for survival for entire sections of the economy. . . ."9 In short, the
removal of undocumented workers does not necessarily create more,
or better, employment opportunities for native workers.
35. D. NORTH & M. HOUSTOUN, supra note 7, at 159.

36. See Cardenas, Mexican Immigration and the United States Labor Market,
AGENDA,

Mar.-Apr. 1979, 28, 31.

37. For a summary of the average wage-per-hour for all three studies cited supra
note 7, see W. CORNELIUS, supra note 30, at 13-14.

38. Id. at 11.
39.

Wall St. J., June 21, 1977, at 8, col. 1.
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Public Assistance and Undocumented Persons
Many of the past mass deportation efforts were legitimized by the
argument that undocumented persons live off the public dole.40 Current restrictionist legislative proposals are often supported by the
same contention. The reality of the situation, however, is very different. At least six major field studies have found extremely low rates
of utilization of public assistance programs by these persons."' Research in high impact areas found that undocumented persons represented a small percentage of the total welfare caseload. 2
An often overlooked fact is that undocumented persons pay taxes
through automatic wage deductions (they rarely file income tax returns), through sales tax on retail purchases, and through property
tax calculated into rent payments. In San Diego County, Villalpando
found that undocumented persons receive around $2 million in public assistance; yet they contribute approximately $48 million in tax
funds. 3 Professor Cornelius argues that "Mexican migrants are
clearly subsidizing the United States Social Security system to the
tune of hundreds of millions of dollars per year...

."

Far from liv-

ing off public assistance, undocumented persons are actually subsidizing the system.
INS ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND UNION ORGANIZING ACTIVITY
An examination of the INS enforcement policy reveals that it is
centered on the workplace. Its execution portends serious disruptions
of union organizing activity or the breach of existing collective bargaining agreements. This section has two interrelated objectives: to
document the existence of such a policy and to demonstrate through
actual examples how INS factory raids have affected concerted activity. This documentation will assist in framing the more theoretical
analysis to follow, and will demonstrate the need for a legal response
to the recurring interference with legitimate efforts to resolve economic grievances.
The Border Patrol, established in 1924, is the enforcement branch
40. C. McWILLIAMS, FACTORIE IN THE FIELDS 129 (1939). The author suggests
that the seemingly uncoerced "repatriation" may have resulted from threats to take un-

employed Mexican workers off relief.
41. For a synthesis of the findings of these studies see W.
7, at 84-90.
42. H. CROSS & J. SANDOS, supra note 26, at 101.
43. M. VILLALPANDO, supra note 7, at 57, 173.
44. W. CORNELIUS, supra note 7, at 88.

CORNELIuS,

supra note

of the INS but its function is confined to the immediate border area.
Once undocumented workers have gained access to the interior of
the country, the task of detecting them falls on the investigative arm
of the INS. 45 It is estimated that eighty-five percent of the enforcement personnel are located on the border, causing a strain on the
minimal agents policing the interior.4 To deal with this dilemma,
the INS has implemented a policy with a premium on "volume;"
namely, dragnet raids with all the potential constitutional violations
47
inextricably bound with such tactics.
In the early seventies, the presence of undocumented workers in
certain industrial sectors increased due to employers' efforts to
counteract the economic downswing of the time. The Nixon administration reacted by ordering an intensification of its policy of residential raids, which entailed house searches and dragnets at theaters
and sporting events. 48 During this same period the Chicano community had become increasingly politicized and certain unions abandoned their traditional anti-alien stance. The egregious violation of
fundamental rights (i.e., house searches, indiscriminate interrogation
of theater audiences) generated political concern over the plight of
undocumented workers,
and efforts to politically and legally defend
49
them soon followed.

Strident protests over these objectionable enforcement tactics compelled the Ford administration to call for a reduction of neighborhood raids while it conducted various studies on the question. This
hiatus on residential raids, however, did not mean that other enforcement strategies would not be implemented. It soon became evident
that a modulated strategy of dragnet factory raids was being effectuated. The "benefits" of this enforcement policy to the INS were
many; two of the most important were a maximizing of efficiency
(relatively few agents could contain hundreds of workers within the
confines of a factory) and the lessening of political repercussions because the raids were conducted away from the Chicano community
at a site where the privacy interests of the workers were minimal.50
45. DOMESTIC COUNCIL COMM. ON ILLEGAL ALIENS, PRELIMINARY REPORT 73
(1976).
46. Id. at 81.
47. For a study of INS Area Control Operations and their impingement on statutory and constitutional rights of aliens and citizens see U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR 79-95 (1980).
48. P. BAIRD & E. MCCAUGHAN, BEYOND

THE BORDER 156 (1979). The authors
described the Nixon administration's policy of INS residential raids as follows: "On
street corners, in theaters, and especially inside factories, thousands upon thousands of
non-white persons were stopped, interrogated and then deported without a
trial-including some United States citizens."
49. Id. at 163.
50. For a discussion on the impact of factory raids on union organizing efforts
among undocumented workers see generally, Undocumented Aliens: Hearings Before the
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The INS policy of policing the jobsite has resulted in employers

calling in la migra51 whenever their workers have indicated a desire

to organize. Some union officials charge outright collusion between
INS agents and employers, citing instances when only aliens who

were union activists were picked up and deported.52 It follows from
the logic of the INS enforcement policy that it could be easily uti-

lized as an intimidating and union-busting instrument. 3

Examples of INS suspect timing of factory raids abound. One re-

cent documented instance of such interference with organizing activities is the election-day raid at Lilli Diamond Originals. Lilli Diamond is a division of Campus Casuals, one of the fastest growing

women's garment manufacturers, which experienced a thirty-three
percent increase in gross sales and a sixty-two percent increase in net
profits between 1973 and 19 76 ." The ethnic composition of the work
force is estimated at ten to fifteen percent black and white workers,
and twenty-five to thirty percent Asian. The bulk of the workers are
Mexican or Central American. Over half of the Latinos were undocumented, as were a good percentage of the Asian workers.55
A unionization campaign was undertaken by the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (ILGWU) in October, 1976. The
campaign was heated with accusations of unfair labor practices levied by both sides. At various company meetings and in individual
conferences, management reminded the workers of their illegal status in the country. Eventually, an election date was set for Friday,
Subcomm. on the Dep'ts of State, Justice, and Commerce, The Judiciary,and Related
Agencies of the House Comm. on Appropriations, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 319 (1978)

(statement of Carlos Vellanoweth).
51. "La migra" is a vernacular term popularly used by Chicanos to refer to the
INS and its agents. The term ostensibly derives from the Spanish-language equivalent of
"immigration" (inmigracion).

52. Lindsey, Unions Move to Organize Illegal Aliens in the West, N.Y. Times,
June 3, 1979, at 42, col. 5.
53. Jay Mazur, vice-president of the International Ladies' Garment Workers'
Union (ILGWU) recently wrote:
[M]any employers have cleverly used the INS as insurance against union drives.
In California, for instance, employers faced with union representation elections
have frequently called in INS agents shortly before the voting. On election day
many potential union supporters are either back in their home countries, or attempting to avoid deportation.
Mazur, The Return of the Sweatshop, THE NEW LEADER, Aug. 13, 1979, at 7.
54. For a discussion of the economic and political context of this unionization campaign and a description of INS tactics see Vasquez, The Election Day Immigration Raid
at Lilli Diamond Originals and the Response of the ILGWU in MEXICAN WOMEN IN
THE UNITED STATES 145 (M. Mora & A. Del Castillo ed. 1980).
55. Id.

January 14, 1977.56
On the eve of the election, INS agents detained two female workers, both of whom had signed authorization cards. The next day,
shortly after 9:00 a.m., three immigration vans and six agents descended onto the premises. The agents arrested ten workers, all but
one of whom were union supporters or members of the shop organizing committee. The selective nature of the arrests and the fact that
pro-union workers received special home visits by INS agents indicated a degree of coordination between management and the Service. 57 Certainly, the timing of the raids (a day before and during
the election) is suspect, and its chilling and intimidating effect on the
workers is unmistakable.
The May 17, 1978, Sbicca Shoe Company raid represents another
occasion of INS interference with efforts by undocumented workers
to organize. After a bitter organizing campaign, the Los Angelesbased Retail Clerks Local 1428 lost a representational election by 10
votes out of over 700 cast and immediately filed numerous unfair
labor practices charges.- The next day the INS raided the factory
and attempted to deport 120 of the workers. 8
An unanticipated quick legal response by the union resulted in the
issuing of a temporary restraining order preventing the undocumented workers' deportation. Of the 120 detained workers, 65 decided to retract their "voluntary departure.""9 The so-called Sbicca
case60 stands as one of the first attempts to compel the INS to establish deportability of people without the use of illegally obtained and
coerced evidence. From a labor relations standpoint, it represents one
of the first instances in which a union has come to the legal defense
of undocumented workers engaged in concerted activity.
The remainder of the article will analyze the status of undocumented workers within existing labor law doctrine and immigration
law mandates. This investigation will determine the privileges and
protections extended by the NLRA to these workers.

56. Id. at 146.
57. Id.
58. Bowman, Sbicca Workers Winning - LN.S.Reshuffling Deck, IMMIGRATION
NEWSLETTER, Nov. 1978 - Feb. 1979, at 5.
59. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1982); 8 C.F.R. § 242.5 (1983). The grant of voluntary departure is legally significant in our analysis of the remedial powers of the Board.
See infra note 240.
60. Vallejo v. Sureck, No. CV78-1912-WMB (C.D. Calif. Dec. 27, 1978) (order
granting temporary restraining order).
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LABOR AND IMMIGRATION LAW INTERFACE

Congruous Policies

The examination of the status of undocumented workers under the
NLRA has obvious immigration policy implications. The initial
query is whether labor and immigration law confront each other in
an irreconcilable antinomy on this question, or whether the respective policies are in accord. Assuming these policies are harmonious,
do the policy foundations of immigration law foreclose the conferring
of employee status on these workers? This section will analyze the
labor law rationale for extending NLRA protection to undocumented workers. Also examined is the argument that immigration
laws preclude such coverage.
Labor Law Analysis
The ambiguous social and economic role of undocumented workers
manifests itself in an ambivalent legal status that makes an analysis
of their economic rights under the NLRA problematic. Although
there are long-standing laws forbidding the entry and residence of
undocumented persons in the country, the federal government has
conveniently waived these laws when economically expedient, and
employers have utilized the labor of millions of undocumented persons in total disregard of legal dictates., 1 The misconceived (but legally operative) notion that persons who violate the guidelines of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) on entry and residence into
the United States are shorn of all civil rights holds sway in much of
the legal analysis on this question. This misconception has resulted
based on
in undocumented persons being refused access to courts
6
lack of standing solely because of their "illegal" status.
61. See infra text accompanying notes 134-144.
62. See Comment, The Right of an Illegal Alien to Maintain a Civil Action, 63
L. REV. 762 (1975). This Comment offers an extensive and thoughtful analysis of

CALIF.

the issue. The author characterizes the "outlaw" concept of undocumented workers as
follows:
To some, it might seen incredible that in the United States today there could
still exist "outlaws" in the traditional common law sense of the word: persons
who, although abused in every conceivable way, would be denied the protection
of law in court .

.

. However, many people do find this credible indeed. For

there exists a common misconception that persons who violate the guidelines
established by the Immigration and Nationality Act for entry into or stay in the
United States can and should be deprived of the right to bring a civil action in
court.
Id. at 762.

Critics of NLRA coverage for undocumented workers premise
their opposition on this "outlaw" notion. They assert that "illegal"
workers cannot be presumed to have legal rights under the NLRA.
This is especially true in the labor area because immigration law is
violated directly by the desire to obtain employment. Consequently,
it is argued that the NLRA cannot shroud persons with protection at
the workplace when their very presence in the country contravenes
United States immigration policy.
The inclusion of undocumented workers under the mantle of the
NLRA could ensnarl federal immigration and labor law in a tangled
antinomy. Since Congress cannot be presumed to have contemplated
such a result,6 3 the text, legislative history, and animating principles
of the NLRA must be carefully scrutinized before a determination
of coverage can be rendered. Assuming that federal labor law accords these workers employee status, federal immigration law must
also be surveyed to determine whether it independently precludes
such a legal conclusion. If this is the case, we are presented with the
complex task of determining which body of federal law should take
priority.
The NLRA definition of employee in section 2(3)" does not on its
face exclude or include undocumented workers. The definition includes "any employee," and undocumented workers are absent from
the list of persons excluded by the NLRA. The NLRB's decisions
interpreting this provision, however, clearly instruct that it covers
'65
"all employees in the conventional as well as the legal sense."
NLRB opinions have consistently held that undocumented workers
are employees within the meaning of the NLRA. The legal cornerstone for the policy decision to include undocumented workers under
63. Since both the NLRA and portions of the INA are explicitly concerned with
the protection of labor, presumably these provisions should be read in pari materia unless
a clear antinomy is indicated by the appropriate statutory construction. See generally 82
C.J.S. Statutes §§ 365-366 (1953) (discusses the appropriate canons of legal construction in instances of this nature).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1976) reads:
The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the
employees of a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states oth-

erwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence
of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair

labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially
equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his

home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual

having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual employed as a
supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway
Labor Act . . .as amended from time to time, or by any other person who is
not an employee as herein defined.
65. E.g. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 9 N.L.R.B. 1262, 1274 (1938) (held that certain "motor route drivers" were employees within the meaning of section 2(3) of the
Act).
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the NLRA is Logan and Paxton.6 In this case the Board first articulated its judgment that the purposes of the NLRA brooked no
alienage distinction in its coverage. The decision not to differentiate
between citizens and non-citizens, however, appears to be dicta propounded in the conclusory footnote. The footnote reads:
While no direct issue was made at the hearings as to the inclusion in the
units of non-citizen employees and their eligibility to participate in the elections, it is evident from the record that such an issue may arise at the time
of the elections. The Act does not differentiate between citizens and noncitizens. In order to effectively carry out the purposes of the Act, we conclude that no distinction should be drawn on such a basis. .

.

. Non-citizen-

ship of an employee shall not,67consequently, constitute a disqualification for
participation in the elections.

Although the Board offered no rationale for its determination of inclusion, the footnote indicates that the reason for its decision is to
effectuate the policy of the NLRA. 8
The Board has recognized the "employee" status of aliens even
against union challenge.6 Additionally, the Board was confronted
with cases in 194970 and 195371 that in part dealt with the right of
66.

55 N.L.R.B. 310 (1944).

67. Id. at 315 n.12.
68. Exclusion of undocumented workers has repercussions not only for them but
for domestic workers as well. If undocumented workers are deemed unprotected, then the
NLRA's policy objective of promoting collective bargaining agreements is circumvented;
it is unlikely that undocumented workers would initiate organizing activities, and even if
they did initiate such efforts, strikes and other job actions are not likely to result in
collective bargaining agreements. Additionally, the ability of domestic workers to obtain
collective bargaining agreements is also jeopardized. Enterprises often employ undocumented persons in positions that require they work side-by-side or in complementary jobs
with domestic workers. Consequently, native workers may not be able to unionize because even an effective strike can be easily weathered by an employer relying on the
unprotected class of workers. As one commentator has asserted:
Lower wage rates and worse work conditions could be imposed on the unprotected workers, thus driving down the potential for higher wages for the protected workers. And the ability of the protected workers to exert economic pressure on the employer would be undercut by the presence of the unprotected
class. It would simply be very impractical and contrary to the purposes of the
[NLRA] for two groups of workers to do substantially the same work and yet
have only one set protected by the collective bargaining agreement.
R. Romero, Undocumented Aliens and the National Labor Relations Act 5 (1979) (un-

published senior research paper, Northwestern Law School).
69. Azusa Citrus Ass'n, 65 N.L.R.B. 1136 (1946) (Mexican National permitted to
participate in board election against union's contention to the contrary); Allen and
Sandilands Packing Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 724 (1944) (Union's argument for the exclusion of
Mexican Nationals was rejected because non-citizenship is neither a ground for exclusion
from a bargaining unit nor a disqualification for participation in elections conducted by
the board).
70. Cities Service Oil Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 324, 331 (1949) (citing Azusa Citrus
Ass'n, 65 N.L.R.B. 1136 (1946) and Logan and Paxton, 55 N.L.R.B. 310 (1944), the

aliens to vote in union elections. In both cases the Board decided the
question summarily, noting that the aliens' right to vote was too well
established to warrant justification. It was not until the early seventies, however, that the Board was directly faced with issues relating
to the coverage of undocumented aliens under the NLRA.
In Lawrence Rigging, Inc.,72 the administrative law judge did not
believe that the authorization card of an alien lacking "working papers" was valid because he was not an "employee" under the
NLRA. The Board found nothing in the Act to support that position
and reiterated its policy of giving aliens the right to vote in union
elections. It expressly held that undocumented aliens' authorization
cards are to be tabulated in determining whether the union represented a majority of union employees. This determination did not
elaborate on the extra-legal status of the aliens involved, and the
NLRB left untouched the anemic rationale supporting its prior
decisions.
The decision in Handling Equipment Corp.73 cast some doubt on
the continued application of Board policy. In Handling a representational election resulted in a union victory, with the union receiving
sixteen votes in a unit of twenty-eight. The same evening the employer conducted
an immigration check. The employer asked to see
"green cards" 7' 4 and the twelve workers who could not produce them
were dismissed, although seven later did produce their cards and
were reinstated. The Board held that because there were sixteen prounion votes cast the employer could not reasonably suspect that the
twelve had cast those votes. Furthermore, the employer's "conduct
indicates that [the employer] was concerned with their alien status
rather than with the nature of their vote ... ." The reason for the
employer's sudden urge to conduct an immigration raid was left
unexplored, and the notion that the employer already knew the imNLRB held that the "eligibility of aliens to cast ballots in board elections is too well
established to warrant justification anew here").
71. Siedmon, Siedmon, Henkin, and Siedmon, 102 N.L.R.B. 1492, 1493 (1953)
(citing Cities Service Oil Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 324 (1949), the court held that "the eligibility of aliens to vote in Board elections is well established").
72. 202 N.L.R.B. 1094 (1973).
73. 209 N.L.R.B. 64 (1974).
74. The term "green card" or "Mica" is the vernacular designation for the alien
registration receipt card (I-151). This card serves as documentation of the fact that an
alien can legally reside in the United States as a permanent resident. It is important to
note, however, that an alien can be legally in the United States without such a card.
75. Handling Equipment Corp., 209 N.L.R.B. at 65. The administrative law judge
found it "difficult to understand how [the employer] could expect the employees to
equate the lack of a green card with voting for the union." Id. It seems likely, however,
that workers who are questioned about their immigration status only hours after a representation election won by the union, would interpret such action as retribution for their
union support.
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migration status of his employees was not even entertained.7 6
The two latest Board decisions reaffirm prior policy and acknowledge the reality of employer-undocumented worker relations. In
Amay's Bakery & Noodle Co.,77 the employer learned that a unionization campaign was in progress, so he demanded that workers lacking green cards not return to work. The Board explicitly held that
undocumented workers are covered by the NLRA and that the employer's actions constituted a section 8(a)(3) violation.7 8 It also held
that the immigration interrogation and subsequent firing was impermissible discrimination, and not an exercise in good citizenship.
The Board decision in Sure-Tan, Inc.,7n represents an unequivocal
confirmation of its policy to include undocumented workers under
the NLRA's definition of employee. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit's
decision 80 in this case is the first time Board policy has received an
imprimatur of support at the circuit court of appeals level. This decision, and the decision in Apollo Tire,81 merit careful examination in
an attempt to identify the reasoning and justification for such a
policy.
In Sure-Tan a representational election conducted in December of
1976 resulted in the union 2 receiving six of the seven votes cast. The
employer objected to the results of the election primarily because six
' The Regional Diof the seven eligible voters were "illegal aliens."83
rector of the NLRB found the employer's objections to be without
76. See M. BARRERA, supra note 16, at 123-124. In his analysis of Mexican immigration, the author discerned a prevailing misconception with serious social consequences.
Barrera states:
It is important to dispel what I see as one of the key misconceptions surrounding
this subject, which can be referred to as "the myth of employer naivete." According to this assumption, employers are largely unaware of the documented or
undocumented status of their workers and do not have preferences one way or
the other. On the contrary, there is a wealth of direct and indirect evidence that
employers are well aware of their workers' status, and that many have a strong
preference for the undocumented worker.

Id.
77. 227 N.L.R.B. 214 (1976).
78. Id.
79. 231 N.L.R.B. 138 (1977) (employee turnover in the certified unit as a result of
deportation of illegal alien employees is irrelevant to issue of union's majority status).
80. NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc. 583 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1978) (alien workers are employees under the NLRA).
81. NLRB v. Apollo Tire Co., 604 F.2d 1180 (9th Cir. 1979) (undocumented
aliens are employees under the NLRA).
82. Chicago Leather Workers' Union, Local 431, Amalgamated Meatcutters and
Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-CIO, now merged with the Retail Clerks'
International to form the United Food and Commercial Workers' International Union.
83. 583 F.2d at 357.

merit and specifically decided that the undocumented workers were
employees entitled to vote.
The employer responded to the union's certification by refusing to
negotiate, which in turn prompted the filing of an unfair labor practice charge by the union. The company filed an answer to the unfair
labor charge noting that the workers had been deported. The Board
issued a bargaining order compelling the employer to enter into good
faith negotiations with the union. At this juncture the employer took
an appeal of right 4 to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit.
The Sure-Tan court's analysis of the status of undocumented
workers under the NLRA resonates with immigration law implications; however, it is important to understand the labor law aspects of
this decision. The court determined that the definition of "employee"
was of broad scope. It took notice of certain "contrary hints" in the
legislative history of the Act, 5 but concluded that they were inapposite and upheld the "longstanding and consistent"8' 6 policy of the
Board on this question.
The majority's decision regarding the coverage of undocumented
workers was grounded on the foreseeable adverse consequences to
the labor-employer equation. The union had not violated the law, so
decertification would visit a penalty on an innocent entity.8 7 Furthermore, businesses would be tempted to hire undocumented workers
because any union these workers formed could be decertified by the
employer simply by revealing the illegal status of the workers. This
fact, combined with the statutory election bar,88 could result in the
employer having consecutive periods of union-free life. Consequently,
decertification would grant a benefit to the party that facilitates the
circumvention of immigration law (i.e., the employer), and the benefit could potentially serve as a long-term shield against unionization
by encouraging the repeated transgression of immigration policy.
The court concluded that the scale attempting to approximate equal84. 29 U.S.C. § 160(0 (1976). Section 160(0 reads:
Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in whole
or in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in any United
States court of appeals in the circuit wherein the unfair labor practice in question was alleged to have been engaged in ....
85. 583 F.2d at 358-359.
86. Id. at 359. The court, citing Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Interior Board of Mine
Operations Appeals, 523 F.2d 25, 36 (7th Cir. 1975), relied on the principle that although administrative interpretations are not controlling, nevertheless, the decisions of an
administrator charged with the enforcement of the statute are entitled to deference unless there are compelling indications that they are wrong.
87. 583 F.2d at 360 ("here the lasting benefit goes not to the law violators - the
aliens - but rather to the Union, which is not accused of wrongdoing").
88. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1976). This section provides that "No election shall be
directed in any bargaining unit or any subdivision within which in the preceding twelvemonth period, a valid election shall have been held."
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ity of bargaining power at the workplace is unfairly tipped toward
management by excluding undocumented workers from labor law
protection.
The Ninth Circuit was also confronted with the issue of whether
undocumented workers were "employees" within the meaning of the
NLRA. In Apollo Tire several employees complained about the
company's failure to pay overtime wages owed them, 89 and seven
employees later lodged complaints with the Wage and Hour Division
of the Department of Labor.90 Management laid off six of the seven
complaining workers within four days, citing decrease in sales and
corresponding buildup of inventory as the reason for dismissal.9 1 In
administrative hearings investigating unfair labor practice charges,
an additional reason for the lay-off was revealed: the employees had
complained to the "Labor Commission. 92 Following the company's
refusal to recall the discharged employees, the NLRB held the employer in violation of section 8(a)(1) and (4) of the NLRA.93 The
Board ordered the reinstatement of the six dismissed employees as
partial remedy for the violation. 4
In assaying the company's contention that Congress intended to
exclude workers without proper work authorization from NLRA coverage, the court noted that section 2(3) defines "employee" broadly
and undocumented workers are not specifically excluded from protection. 95 Given the Board's consistent interpretation of the definition, the court deferred to the NLRB's understanding of the statute
since it was not clearly in error.96
Immigration Law Analysis
In Sure-Tan the employer argued that the Board policy of allowing undocumented workers to vote in representation elections was
untenable because it contradicted federal immigration law and policy. Although they reached contrary conclusions, both the majority
and the dissent determined that the policies of the NLRA and the
Immigration and Nationality Act were not inconsistent.
89. 604 F.2d 1180, 1181 (9th Cir. 1979).

90. Id.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
tions in

Id.at 1182.
Id.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (4) (1976).
604 F.2d at 1182.
Id.
For a discussion of the judicial deference accorded to administrative interpretathis context see supra note 86.

The company argued that section (212)(a)(14)9 7 of the INA prohibits the employment of undocumented workers; consequently, to
hold that they are employees under the NLRA would directly contradict federal immigration law. A cursory reading of section
212(a)(14) readily discloses that it is applicable to aliens seeking to
enter 8 the United States by requiring labor certification before a
visa can be issued. This section establishes entrance requirements for
certain types of aliens; it does not apply to the employment of aliens
once inside the United States. In fact, no immigration statute prohibits an undocumented worker from working in the United States. 9
Not only is the INA barren of any provision prohibiting undocumented persons from working, it also lacks any provision preventing
employers from hiring them.100 The argument that section
212(a)(14)101 makes such provisions superfluous and redundant is
spurious. First, section 212(a)(14) has never been construed to prohibit undocumented persons from working or employers from hiring
them.1 02 Second, since at least 1951, periodic efforts have been made
to make the employment of undocumented workers unlawful; all
have met with rejection at the federal level.10 3
A review of United States immigration law demonstrates an absence of direct conflict between it and Board and judicial rulings interpreting the INA on this question. An evaluation of the policy underpinnings of these laws, however, does suggest a potential clash of
legislative purposes. The general goals of the NLRA are to promote
97. 8 U.S.C. § I182(a)(14) (1982). This section states, in relevant part:
[T]he following classes of aliens . . . shall be excluded from admission into the
United States:
(a)(14) Aliens seeking to enter the United States, for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General
that (A) there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified
.. . and available. . . to perform such skilled or unskilled labor, and (B)
the employment of such aliens will not adversely affect the wages and
working conditions of the workers in the United States similarly
employed ....
98. For a discussion of the legal importance of "entry" in this context see Comment, The Legal Status of Undocumented Aliens: In Search of a Consistent Theory, 16
Hous. L. REV. 667, 702-709 (1979).
99. NLRB v. Sure-Tan, 583 F.2d 355, 359 (7th Cir. 1978); see also NLRB v.
Apollo Tire Co., 604 F.2d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 1979).
100. Although "harboring" an undocumented person is in violation of the INA, a
proviso to section 1324(a) removes employment from the definition of haboring. See 8
U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1982). This so-called "Texas Proviso" was enacted at the vehement
insistence of Southwestern agribusiness which relies heavily on undocumented labor.
101. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1982).
102. See Annot., 41 A.L.R. FED. 608 (1979). A review of cases interpreting section 212(a)(14) of the INA fails to disclose support for the proposition that it prohibits
the employment of undocumented workers once inside the United States.
103. See Centro de Inmigracion, Laws Prohibiting the Employment of Undocumented Workers, (1977) (unpublished paper, Georgetown Law Center).
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industrial peace through balanced collective bargaining power between employers and employees' representatives. 0 The intendment
of section 212(a)(14) is, in part, the protection of American labor
from unwanted foreign competition. 10 5 Inquiry into this question,
therefore, must proceed to an investigation of these respective policies as perceived by the majority and dissent in Sure-Tan and
Apollo Tire.
The Sure-Tan dissent methodically set forth the reasons for taking
a contrary view on the issue of NLRA coverage of undocumented
employees. It commenced by citing section 212(a)(14) of the INA
from which it deduced "a presumption that aliens should not be permitted to enter this country to perform labor."10 The opinion then
noted that the Board is not at liberty to determine which related
laws it may ignore. Moreover, the fact that the Board must consider
immigration matters does not place the enforcement of immigration
statutes upon it. The dissent, unfortunately, does not intimate where
enforcement would lie. It summarily dealt with the right of undocumented workers to employee status by stating that "[t]he six [undocumented workers] had no right to be here, no right to the jobs,
and consequently no right to make determinations binding on the
respondents' business . .., That the employer had previous
knowledge of the workers' immigration status was of no moment because Congress had imposed no liabilities on the hiring of undocumented workers. Concluding its opinion, the dissent deemed speculative the argument that requiring the Board to give consideration to
immigration law would result in increased hiring of undocumented
workers to defeat unionization and, in any event, unions would support immigration enforcement to protect their members.
The majority in Sure-Tan initiated its discussion by referring to
the broad statutory definition of employee and the "longstanding and
consistent interpretation"108 of the Board designating undocumented
workers as employees under the NLRA. It observed that the INA is
barren of any direct interdiction of employers hiring undocumented
".

104. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937) (union is
essential to give laborers opportunity to deal with employer on a basis of equality).
105. See Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65 (1974); see also Annot., supra note 102, at
617-618.
106. 583 F.2d at 361-362 (Wood, H., dissenting). For an analysis of the applicability of this presumption to the employment of undocumented workers see infra text
accompanying notes 158-161.
107. 583 F.2d at 362 (Wood, H., dissenting).
108. 583 F.2d at 359. See supra note 86 for a discussion of judicial deference
toward administrative decisions.

workers or these workers finding employment; consequently, no direct antinomy existed between federal labor and immigration law.
The "outlaw" concept of the rights of undocumented persons was
explicitly rejected.109 The majority recognized that these persons are
endowed with certain constitutional rights 110 and, as such, merely
citing their illegal status cannot substitute for a substantive immigration law analysis.
In assessing the policy concerns of immigration law on this question, the majority held that "in the long run, declining to certify this
union could only have the effect of encouragingviolations of immigration laws."""1 It drew attention to the crucial fact that the employer, not the union, determines the status of the employees. Hence,
refusing to certify a union with a majority of undocumented workers
"would be giving employers an extra incentive to hire aliens and
' 11 2
thus would be defeating the goals of the immigration law.
The Sure-Tan court then illustrated the latter proposition using
the facts of the case before it. The Regional Director's supplemental
decision noted that the president of Sure-Tan, Inc. admitted knowing
the illegal status of his workers several months before the election
was held. The court then stated an "obvious possibility" is that the
company hired undocumented workers knowing that if the aliens
successfully unionized they could be reported to the INS and deported.113 The opinion continued, "[I]n view of this prior knowledge
(and prior disregard of its alleged duty under the immigration laws),
it ill becomes the Company to argue after losing the election that
certification would conflict with the immigration laws. '11 4 The majority then concluded by elaborating on the dissent's contention that
it was imposing a "liability" by certifying the union. Certainly, the
employer's prior disregard of immigration policy (by hiring undocumented workers) does not give rise to any liability, but neither does
it absolve it of the obligation (like every other covered employer) to
comply with federal labor law. The certification of a duly elected
union is not a penalty but merely a vindication of labor law.
The dissent's assertion that unions can be relied on to prevent the
109. The opinion noted that "to the extent that the immigration laws rather than
the labor laws are relevant, the analysis cannot stop after noting the aliens' status but
must determine how the policies underlying the immigration laws are best advanced
under the circumstances." 583 F.2d at 359. See Comment, supra note 62, at 762.
110. The court observed that "despite the fact that their presence is unlawful, [undocumented workers] have some constitutional rights . . . ." 583 F.2d at 359. For an
excellent discussion of the constitutional rights of undocumented persons see generally
Comment, supra note 98, at 677-702.
II1.
583 F.2d at 360 (emphasis added).
112, Id. (emphasis' added).
113. Id. The court astutely pierced the "myth of employer naivete" discussed
supra note 76.
114. 583 F.2d at 360.
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increased hiring of undocumented workers by employers seeking to
avoid unionization requires a brief comment. Given the debilitated
state of the United States trade union movement, this may be an
unwarranted expectation; nevertheless, even assuming a viable union
movement, it does not follow that INS policy will be more responsive
to labor than to management. Established unions will no doubt protect their members; however, undocumented workers are primarily
employed in unorganized sectors, and it is precisely the initial extension of union protection to these workers that is impeded by the dissent's position. A union cannot protect workers it cannot organize.
The Apollo Tire court, incorporating a Sure-Tan analysis, also rejected the assertion that Board policy contravened the letter or spirit
of the INA. 115 Instead, the coverage of undocumented workers under
the NLRA furthers the policies underlying the INA."' The opinion
in relevant part reads:
Were we to hold the NLRA inapplicable to (undocumented workers], employers would be encouraged to hire such persons in hopes of circumventing
the labor laws. The result would be more work for [undocumented
117 workers]
and violations of the immigration laws would be encouraged.

The opinion raises a further concern about the Board's competence
to delve into immigration questions, which the court felt were out of
the NLRB's field of expertise and, as such, were matters properly
before the INS." 8 This discussion ended with the court noting that
an employer could report an undocumented worker to the INS, but
the "employer is not permitted to commit unfair labor practices in
the knowledge that the Board is powerless to remedy them."'" 9
In reviewing the immigration law arguments against the coverage
of undocumented workers under the NLRA, the circuit courts have
not only rejected the notion of an antinomy but also have held that
coverage promotes the interests embodied in the INA. Although this
conclusion appears well-supported in law and policy, critics forcefully point to the fact that the initial premise of consonance between
the two bodies of law may be incorrect. These persons advance the
compelling argument that protecting undocumented workers under
the NLRA subverts the "safeguards" to United States labor encased
115. NLRB v. Apollo Tire Co., 604 F.2d 1180, 1183 (9th Cir. 1979).
116. Id.
117.

Id.

118. Id. The Sure-Tan court also held that immigration questions "should be left
583 F.2d at 359.
to immigration officials rather than to the Board .
119. 604 F.2d at 1183.

in various INA provisions. 120 This objection to the coverage of undocumented workers under the NLRA merits a closer analysis.
Incongruous Policies
The Sure-Tan and Apollo Tire rationale for including undocumented workers under the mantle of the NLRA is based on the finding of an absence of conflict between federal labor and immigration
law. Critics argue, however, that a fundamental incompatibility exists between the policies of the INA, which manifests a strong concern for "safeguarding" domestic labor, and the current NLRB policy of protecting foreign workers.'"" The persistence with which this
contention is made, and its plausible support in immigration law and
doctrine, calls for a detailed examination of its postulates.
Safeguarding American Labor and Section 212(a)(14):
History and Statutory Interpretations
The question considered is not whether the regulation and control
of immigration is an important national goal. It clearly is. Nor is the
question whether Congress could prohibit the undocumented alien
from obtaining employment or the employer from hiring such a person. It clearly could. Rather, the issue addressed is whether the provisions and concerns of the INA should be construed so as to bring it
in conflict with the NLRB's policy of according employee status to
undocumented workers.
An historical assessment of United States immigration policy, the
critics contend, discloses a steadfast and forceful congressional concern 'with the economic well-being of United States workers. The
Alien Contract Labor Acts'22 evidence early efforts to deal with the
influx of immigrant workers and their inexorable tendency to "degrade American labor and to reduce it to the level of imported pauper labor."' 23 The 1917 Literacy Act 24 and the quantitative restrictions of the National Quota Laws 25 reflect subsequent congressional
120. See infra text accompanying footnotes 121-144.
121. See Note, The Alienation of American Labor: The National Labor Relations
Act and the Regulation of Illegal Aliens, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 961, 987-91
(1981).
122. Act of February 26, 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332; Act of February 23, 1887,
ch. 220, 24 Stat. 414. The Knights of Labor, the first mass organization of United States
workers, lobbied vigorously for the passage of a contract labor law to prevent the use of
immigrant workers as strikebreakers. See Higham, American Immigration Policy in Historical Perspective, 21 LAW & CONTEMP. PROns. 213, 218 (1956). '
123. 16 CONG. REC. 5359 (1885) (quoted in Note, supra note 121, at 975).
124. Act of February 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874. The enactment of this act, over
a second veto by President Wilson, represents the culmination of restrictionist efforts
during the qualitative phase of immigration restruction.
125. Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5; Act of May 26, 1924, ch. 190, 43
Stat. 153.
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interest in protecting the native labor force. The 1965 amendments 126 to the INA illustrate contemporary legislative concern in
promoting the interests of domestic workers. Prior to this enactment
aliens seeking entry into this country were presumed to be admissible
under section 212(a)(14) of the INA absent a contrary finding by
the Secretary of Labor. The 1965 amendments reversed this presumption; an alien was deemed excludable unless the Secretary of
Labor made an affirmative finding of need pursuant to section
212(a)(14). 27 Moreover, the 1976 amendments 2 mandated the application of section 212(a)(14) to Western Hemisphere immigrants
based in part on congressional desire "to protect the domestic labor
force." 112 9 This historical solicitude for United States labor, the argument goes, was ultimately embodied in section 212(a)(14) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.130
Proponents of the "antinomy" argument13 ' interpret the historical
purpose of section 212(a)(14) and its subsequent judicial gloss as
creating "a presumption that aliens seeking employment are illegally
present in the United States unless certified by the Secretary of Labor."13 Moreover, this presumption "operates against the admission
of the alien in order to protect American workers from the likely
detrimental effects of unrestricted immigrant labor.' 133 Accordingly,
the argument is advanced that section 212(a)(14), and the policy
upon which it is based, prohibits the employment of undocumented
workers within the United States. The failure of the Sure-Tan and
Apollo Tire courts to recognize this interdiction is put forth as a
serious analytical error calling for a reconsideration of their
holdings.
126. Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
127. See generally Silva v. Secretary of Labor, 518 F.2d 301 (Ist Cir. 1975); Annot., supra note 102, at § 5.
128. Pub. L. No. 94-571, 90 Stat. 2703 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.).
129. H.R. REP. No. 94-1553, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6073, 6076.
130. Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 212(a)(14), 66 Stat. 163, 183 (codified as amended at
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1982)).
131. The argument that advances the notion that the NLRA and INA are in fundamental conflict is described in this article as the "antinomy" argument. The word "antinomy" is defined as "a contradiction between two apparently equally valid principles or
between inferences correctly drawn from such principles." WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY 50 (1981).
132. Note, supra note 121, at 978.

133. Id. See also Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor, 501 F.2d 757, 761 (D.C. Cir.),

cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1038 (1974).

While this argument brings to the fore pertinent and legitimate
policy concerns, it nevertheless misinterprets the history and scope of
section 212(a)(14), and it fails to adequately explain the conventional legal understanding of immigration law. Additionally, proponents of the antinomy argument fail to provide a persuasive reason
why immigration law should have ascendency over labor law at the
workplace.
The exponents of the antinomy argument espouse an incomplete
reading of United States immigration history. While it is true immigration law has evinced a concern for the interests of native workers,
it is equally true United States immigration law and policy has
demonstrated a persistent desire for obtaining foreign workers. Historical evidence strongly suggests the United States government and
employers initiated and sustained the migration of Mexican workers. 3 The first bracero program of 1918,135 involving an estimated
80,000 Mexican workers, was authorized by a questionable application of immigration laws.136 The program, nevertheless, "served as a
catalyst for augmented immigration ." 37 The legal provisions created
for the protection and benefit of the braceros 138 were flouted because
the "basic weakness of the program was [the] lack of [an] adequate
enforcement machinery."' 3 " More importantly, even after changing
political conditions forced the termination of the legal bracero
program:
The government continued to maintain an informal Mexican labor program
by simply refusing to apply the immigration laws vigorously and systemati134.

For a comprehensive historical analysis of the role of United States employers

in initiating and sustaining the migration of immigrants to this country see Lopez, supra
note 10, at 641-672; M. PIORE, BIRDS OF PASSAGE 19-26 (1979).
135. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,

96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-15
(Comm. Print 1980).
136. Id. at 8. The report observed:
Secretary of Labor Wilson had not consulted with Congress prior to his issuance
of the departmental order admitting temporary alien workers under a suspension
of certain provisions of the 1917 act. Congressman John Burnett of Alabama,
the chairman of the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, informed him that he possessed no such power of suspension, and introduced legislation to repeal the ninth proviso. In a subsequent protest he wrote:
"I do not believe that there is a soul outside your Department that thinks
such a construction should be given this Section [of the 1917 Act]."
(citation omitted).
137. M. REISLER, supra note 12, at 42.
138. "Bracero" is the appellative used in common parlance since 1942 to refer to
Mexican nationals who work in the United States under the contract labor programs of
1917 and 1942. The word "bracero," literally translated, means one who works with his
arms. The closest English equivalent is "fieldhand." See Cardenas, United States Immigration Policy Toward Mexico: An HistoricalPerspective, 2 CHICANO L. REV. 66, 68
n.15 (1975).
139. Scruggs, The First Mexican Farm Labor Program, 2 ARIZ. & THE WEST
322, 324 (1960).
TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAMS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES,
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cally. Far from reducing the number of Mexican workers, the end of the
emergency program marked the beginning of a decade which brought Mexican workers to the United States in vastly increased and unprecedented
numbers.140

Thus, the United States government continued its procurement of
Mexican labor by extra-legal means.
The economic dislocations of the Great Depression eliminated the
need for Mexican labor, and migration from that country was almost
nil throughout the 1930's. In the early 1940's Mexican immigration
was regenerated by the United States government because of its concern with labor conditions in the advent of World War II. The second bracero program, although justified as a war-caused emergency,
lasted twenty-two years and involved between four and five million
Mexican agricultural workers.14 1 The United States government also
countenanced the creation of a reserve of undocumented labor of
similar numbers to complement its bracero labor pool. 142 Such practices as "legalizing" 1 43 undocumented workers and unilaterally opening the border 144 further documented federal government compliance
140.

Kiser, Mexican American Labor Before World War II, 2 J. MEX. AM. HIsT.

128, 136 (1972).
141.

See J.

SAMORA, Los MOJADos: THE WETBACK STORY

57 (1971).

142. Id. The author notes the simultaneous existence of a large bracero and undocumented worker pool and interprets it as follows:
Although these figures as reported by the Immigration Service are questionable
perhaps in many cases unreliable, nevertheless they indicate the magnitude of
the problem and when considered in broader terms, suggest the evolution of an
immigration policy that may best be understood as an extensive farm labor program-an efficient policy representing a consistent desire for Mexicans as laborers rather than as settlers. This policy stands out as a legitimized and profitable
means of acquiring needed labor without incurring the price that characterized
the immigration, utilization, and the eventual settlement of European and Oriental immigrants.
143. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON MIGRATORY LABOR, MIGRATORY LABOR IN AMERICAN AGRICULTURE 53 (1951). The Commission described the "legalizing" of undocumented workers as follows:
A technique more insidious than ingenious was devised and put in effect by the
agencies of the United States Government having responsibility for law enforcement and procurement of labor. In this improvision, the Immigration and Naturalization Service would be allowed to "deport" the [undocumented worker] by
having him brought to the border at which point the [undocumented worker]
would be given an identification slip. Momentarily, he would step across the
boundary line. Having thus been subjected to the magic of token deportation,
the [undocumented worker] was now merely alien and was eligible to step back
across the boundary to be legally contracted.
144. United States government officials "opened" the border for the expressed purpose of unilaterally recruiting Mexican workers on two occasions during the bracero program. In 1948 the border was opened in El Paso, Texas, in response to Mexican government demands for an increase in the wage rate, and in 1954, in California, unilateral
recruitment was initiated in an attempt to force Mexico to accept a new international

with the procurement of temporary labor whether it be of the
"bracero" or "illegal" variety. Consequently, United States immigration policy cannot be simplistically characterized as intended to
"safeguard" domestic labor.
As noted, advocates of the antinomy argument interpret section
212(a)(14) of the INA as creating a presumption that alien employment within the United States is illegal absent compliance with that
provision. 145 Based on this immigration law analysis, they contend
section 212(a)(14) serves as an independent federal statute foreclosing coverage of these workers under the NLRA. As will be seen, this
analysis of immigration law is theoretically muddled, inattentive to
the expressed terms of the statute, and elaborates a one-sided view of
the policy concerns embodied in this section.
The essential flaw in the antinomy argument is the confusion over
the legal rationale in forming the exclusion section of the INA and
the legal rights or disabilities applied to the aliens who are deemed
to have "entered" the United States. Long ago the Supreme Court
acknowledged congressional supremacy in exercising its inherent sovereign power to exclude foreigners.146 Congress has virtually unbridled discretion in the exclusion of those still at our door. For example, the Court has held "[w]hatever the procedure authorized by
Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is
concerned. 147
Juxtaposed to the judicial deference paid to congressional exclusionary enactments, the Court has held that an alien who effectuates
an "entry" into the territorial jurisdiction of the United States is
vested with constitutional rights and entitled to due process before
being expelled. 148 Moreover, the illegal status of the alien is not a
factor in ascertaining the existence of entry, nor does it preclude the
extension of constitutional or statutory rights. The Court in Leng
May Ma v. Barber forthrightly recognized this legal proposition:
[O]ur immigration laws have long made a distinction between those aliens
who have come to our shores seeking admission,. . . and those who are in
accord on braceros. See R. GARCIA,
145.

OPERATION WETBACK

74-76, 83-86 (1980).

See generally Note, supra note 121, at 976-978.

146. See U.S.

CONST.

art. I, § 8. The relevant language of the article provides

"Congress shall have Power to.

.

. regulate Commerce with foreign Nations and ... to

establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization." The House committee in its report on the
INA asserted: "The Power of Congress to control immigration stems from the constitutional power of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations." H.R. REP. No.
1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. i, reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1653,
1653-54.
147. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (emphasis added).
148. The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (alien who has entered
the country, although alleged to be illegally here, must be given opportunity to be heard
on his right to remain in the country).
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the United States after an entry, irrespective of its legality.

49

The Court noted that in the latter instance it "has recognized additional rights and privileges not extended to those in the former category who are merely 'on the threshold of initial entry.' -150
The exponents of the antinomy argument give inadequate consideration to the fact that section 212(a)(14) is undoubtedly an exclusion provision which is being applied to aliens who have already "en-

tered." Implicit in the antinomy argument is the notion that the
fictional entry doctrine - such as parole status where a person actually in the country is not legally deemed to have entered - should
be extended to cover undocumented workers. 151 Indeed, the whole
"outlaw" concept of not according rights for undocumented persons
appears theoretically founded on the misconceived application of
congressional exclusionary powers to persons who have entered, albeit illegally.

The fundamental theoretical problem with utilizing this fictional
entry doctrine to give section 212(a)(14) the scope to prohibit the
employment of undocumented persons for the purposes of a labor
law analysis is that immigration law does not accept such an exten-

sion. Undocumented aliens have entered the country for immigration
law purposes and, consequently, are subject to expulsion rather than
exclusion proceedings. 52 The incidence of entry has substantive
ramifications because the immigrants who have entered have been
accorded rights both in deportation and nondeportation settings.15 3
149. 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958).
150. Id. (quoting Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212
(1953)).
151. See Comment, supra note 98, 705-707. The author argues the preponderant
importance of "entry" emanates from the need to balance "the constitutional guarantee
of due process to all 'persons' within its jurisdiction versus the constitutional commitment
to Congress of foreign policy and the related admission of foreign nationals to the United
States shore." As a result the Court has "abdicated entirely when Congress excludes an
alien still at the threshold ... and has justified the fictional entry doctrine as a device
which allows Congress to be humane in emergencies (medical or political) and to release
excludable aliens from custody without losing any flexibility in deciding whom to admit."

Id. at 706.

152. Id. at 707. The commentator notes the application of the fictional entry doctrine for nonimmigrant purpose is ironic since this doctrine does not apply to undocumented persons for immigration-related questions.
153. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (invalidated a statute
which provided that Chinese persons, found to be illegally present in the country without
a hearing, would be imprisoned at hard labor for up to one year prior to deportation).
See also The Japanese Immigrant case, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903). For a recent analysis
of the constitutional status and protection of undocumented persons in a nondeportation
context viz-a-viz states see Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).

In short, it is theoretically incorrect to give a provision a compass
and substantive meaning for the purpose of analyzing an independent body of federal law which it does not command within its own
statutory structure and doctrine.
The expressed terms of section 212(a)(14) reveal its intendment is
to prohibit the issuance of a visa authorizing the legal admission of
specific immigrants unless the Secretary of Labor has first certified
to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General the lack of "sufficient" native workers and an absence of "adverse affect" on prevailing wages. 5 The text of this provision limits its application to
prospective immigrants eligible for non-preference155 status or seeking admission under the third 156 or sixth 57 preference categories.
Hence, this provision is specifically aimed at visa determinations for
a limited category of prospective immigrants. Neither its express
terms nor its location within the INA statutory scheme suggest it
was intended to reach the employment of undocumented workers
within the United States.
Commentators and the dissent in Sure-Tan, however, cite Pesikoff
v. United States 58 for the broad proposition that section 212(a)(14)
gives rise to a presumption that any alien within the United States is
prohibited from working unless certified pursuant to that provision.159 An examination of Pesikoff fails to yield support for this
broad presumption. Pesikoff dealt with an alien seeking admission
under the sixth preference 60 who was denied entry pursuant to a
Secretary of Labor finding under section 212(a)(14). The putative
employer alleged an abuse of discretion because the Secretary lacked
154. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1982); see supra note 97.
155. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(8) (1982). For a discussion of this provision see C.
GORDON,

E.

GORDON, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW

1979).

§ 2.24n (student ed.

156. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(3) (1982). This section reads:

Visas shall next be made available, in a number not to exceed 10 per centum of
the number specified in section 201(a), to qualified immigrants who are members of the professions, or who because of their exceptional ability in the sciences or the arts will substantially benefit prospectively thb national economy,
cultural interests, or welfare of the United States, and whose services in the

professions, sciences, or arts are sought by an employer in the United States.
157. Id. at § 1153(a)(6). This section provides:
Visas shall next be made available, in a number not to exceed 10 per centum of

the number specified in section 201(a)(ii), to qualified immigrants who are capable of performing specified skilled or unskilled labor, not of a temporary or
seasonal nature, for which a shortage of employable and willing persons exists in
the United States.
158. 501 F.2d 757, cert. denied 419 U.S. 1038 (1974).
159. See Comment, Illegal Aliens Are Employees Under 29 U.S.C § 152(3)
(1976) And May Vote In.Union Certification Election. NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 538
F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1978), 10 RUT.-CAM. L. REv. 747, 751 (1979); Note, supra note 121,

978.

160. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(6) (1982); see supra note 157.
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sufficient evidence to prove the availability of domestic workers. The
court held that section 212(a)(14) was intended to set up a presumption that aliens should not be permitted to enter the United States
for the purpose of performing labor. This presumption, noted the
court, could be overcome only if the Secretary of Labor had determined the conditions set forth in the statute were met. Moreover, the
structure of the statute strongly indicated the Secretary was not obligated to prove in the case of every alien seeking to perform labor
that the conditions were not met. Rather, given the presumption of
the statute against admission, if the Secretary's consultation of the
general labor market data readily available reveals a pool of potential workers available to perform the job which the alien sought, the
burden should be placed on the alien, or the putative employer, to
prove it was not possible for the employer to find qualified American
workers.
The "presumption" involved in this case related to which of the
parties carried the burden of proving the existence vel non of sufficient domestic workers and an adverse effect on prevailing wages.
The court required the Secretary of Labor to carry the burden of
coming forward with minimal evidence, but the alien or the prospective employer must carry the ultimate burden of proving that insufficient domestic workers are available and the employment of this
alien would not adversely affect the native workforce. 1 61 Certainly,
neither the facts, holding, nor dicta indicate the presumption involved reached the employment of undocumented workers who have
entered and are employed within the United'States. The decision,
moreover, does not articulate a justification for the application of
exclusionary provisions to immigrants who have entered the country.
Obviously, adherents of this argument attempt to do by presumption
something Congress has never done by enactment-prohibit the employment of undocumented workers once they are in the country.
Advocates of the antinomy argument suggest that the contradictory nature of immigration and labor law manifests itself at the policy level. The strong concern for safeguarding American labor, the
argument goes, should be made operative by an expansive reading of
section 212(a)(14) of the INA.162 Analysis of this contention, however, reveals several deficiences: First, the express terms of section
212(a)(14) clearly show a blanket prohibition on the employment of
aliens (irrespective of legal status) was never contemplated. Second,
161. 501 F.2d at 761.
162. See generally Note, supra note 121, 976-980.

this section in particular and the INA in general have balanced the
desire to protect native workers with the competing need to import
workers for economic reasons. 11 3 Thus, the strong policy foundations
of this provision do not automatically lead to the conclusion that all
alien employment is illegal absent certification. Third, when Congress has directly considered the prohibition of the employment of
undocumented workers, it has declined to impose any liability on
employers hiring them; 164 in fact, it has even removed such employment from criminal sanction.16 5 Consequently, if an employer is permitted to employ undocumented workers under the INA, it is difficult to see how section 212(a)(14) prohibits these workers from
being employees under the NLRA. In summary, despite the strong
policy concerns buttressing this provision, they cannot be used to alter so radically the concrete means devised by Congress to implement it.
The deficiency of the antinomy argument goes beyond the theoretically confused and inaccurate immigration law analysis; it also fails
to justify why, even assuming an antinomy, immigration law should
take precedence over labor law. This issue is considered next.
NLRA and INA: Principles of Accommodation
At issue in the present discussion is not whether the NLRB must
accommodate the procedure and policy of the INA,"'6 but rather,
whether such an accommodation must result in the exclusion of undocumented workers from the aegis of the NLRA, as adherents of
the antinomy argument contend. In analyzing this question guidance
is sought in an examination of the exact nature of the accommodation required of the Board.
As noted, the argument for the exclusion of undocumented workers consists of two steps. First, a dissonance between labor and immigration law must be established. 87 Second, the legal rationale explaining why the "accommodation" of the INA necessitates that the
Board withhold all protection must be formulated. In order to fully
analyze the accommodation rationale of the antinomy proponents,
163. See supra text accompanying notes 134-144.
164. The Carter administration failed to gain congressional approval of a legislative proposal which included sanctions against the employers of undocumented workers.
H.R. 9531, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); S. 2252, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). Legisla-

tion introduced in 1982 by Senator Simpson and Representative Mazzoli also contains
so-called "employer sanctions" and met with a similar fate. Simpson/Mazzoli II, intro-

duced in 1983, includes employer sanctions as well. However, this bill has also failed to
become law, but it may again be considered in 1984. See supra note 5.
165. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (1982). See supra note 100.

166. See infra text accompanying notes 171-188.
167.

See supra text accompanying notes 97-120 for an analysis of whether the

INA and the NLRA are in fundamental conflict on this question.
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the first step of their argument will be assumed.
The critics' justification for precluding coverage of undocumented
workers is gleaned from the principles of accommodation and the
nature of the INA-NLRA conflict. Citing Southern S.S. Co. v.
NLRB 168 for the proposition that the Board cannot pursue its administration of the NLRA "so single-mindedly" as to impede other federal law, 169 it is argued that the Seventh and Ninth Circuit Courts of
Appeals were "myopic" in their consideration of immigration-related
questions. 1170 Noting that deportation or criminal sanctions can be
imposed on persons violating immigration laws, they maintain the
Board cannot extend statutory protection to such aliens. Hence, the
gravamen of this argument appears to be that the extension of statutory protection of the NLRA to these persons will impede the administration of the INA to an unacceptable degree.
The accommodation rationale articulated by critics of Sure-Tan
and Apollo Tire essentially misunderstands the measure of accommodation required of the Board in an area under its administrative
domain, and suffers from an inadequate assessment of the extent of
interference in immigration matters that may result from these decisions. In Southern S.S. Co. the Court indeed admonished the Board
that it could not "wholly ignore other and equally important Congressional objectives."' 711 Although the language of the Court is
sweeping, the facts17 and legal posture 73 of the case impose definite
constraints on the scope of this injunction. A clarification of the exact nature of the accommodation required can be gleaned from the
Supreme Court's decision in Carpenters' Union v. NLRB. 174 In this
well-known case the Court dealt in part with an argument that cer168.

316 U.S. 31 (1942).

169. Id. at 47.
170. Note, supra note 121, at 988.
171.

316 U.S. at 47.

172. Id. at 38. The Court noted that "ever since men have gone to sea, the relationship of master to seaman has been entirely different from that of employer to employee on land." The nature of this venture requires undivided authority, and this was
reinforced by a mutiny statute that unambiguously forbade the behavior engaged in by
the sailors. Moreover, the withholding of labor in these circumstances is surcharged with
the potential for violence. These unique factual concerns are absent in the usual case of
undocumented worker employment.
173. In Southern S.S. Co. the conflict between the mutiny statute and the NLRA
did not result in the inapplicabilityof the Labor Act. Rather, a specific remedy of the
Act-reinstatement of employees-was" deemed an abuse of discretion because it
"worked directly to weaken the effectiveness of a statutory prohibition .... " Cited in
Carpenters' Union v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 111 (1958).
174. 357 U.S. 93 (1958).

tain "hot-cargo'

' 17'

provisions in collective bargaining agreements

were void ab initio because they violated the Interstate Commerce
Act. Since "hot-cargo" agreements violated the Interstate Commerce Act, it seemed to follow that this same provision was void for
labor law purposes. The Court cautioned, however, against having
determinations under one statute "mechanically carried over in the
interpretation of another statute involving significantly different considerations and legislative purposes."117 The opinion goes on to state:
The Board is not concerned with whether the carrier has performed its obligations to the shipper, but whether the union has performed its obligation
not to induce employees in a manner proscribed by § 8(b)(4)(A). 1 "

The Court then distinguished Southern S.S. Co. noting that a specific remedy of the Board worked to directly weaken the statutory
prohibition against mutiny by crew-members of a vessel. The Court
observed:
Presumed illegality under the Mutiny statute ..
was relied on to establish
an abuse of discretion in giving a remedy. [There was not] any suggestion
that the Board should abandon an independent inquiry into the requirements of its own statute and mechanically accept standards elaborated by
another agency under a different statute for wholly different purposes. 178

Consequently, the admonition in this case simply requires the Board

to fashion remedies that do not directly contradict competing federal
law. While it still can be argued that particular NLRB remedies
may constitute an abuse of discretion based on immigration-related
concerns, 1 9 there is no basis for arguing the Board must withhold

all statutory protection from undocumented workers because of possible immigration interference. Principles of accommodation do not

require an agency's abdication of its legislative mandate.
The principle of accommodation appears to operate only after an

agency has made an independent determination of the questions
under its own statutes. Of course, "[clommon factors may emerge in
the adjudication of these questions, but they are, nevertheless, distinct questions involving independent considerations." 18 0 At the con-

175. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976). This section reads, in relevant part, as follows:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer
to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with any other person, and any contract or
agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement
shall be to such extent unenforceable and void ....
See R. GORMAN, BAsIc TEXT ON LABOR LAW 263-64 (1976).
176. 357 U.S. at 110.
177. Id. (§ 8(b)(4)(A) of the NLRA is codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §
158(b)(4)(A) (1982)).
178. 357 U.S. at 111.
179.

See infra text accompanying notes 218-235.

180. Carpenters' Union v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 110 (1958).

[VOL. 21: 29, 1983]

De-Alienation of American Labor
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

clusion of this analysis the agency must attempt to effectuate its determination in a manner that will not directly undermine the
effectiveness of a collateral statute. The working of this general process can be gleaned from two recent Supreme Court decisions.
In Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization,181 the Court indicated the accommodation the Board
should make between the policies of Title VII 8 2 and the provisions
of the NLRA relating to selection and certification of exclusive bargaining representatives. The Court held that minority employees had
no right under the NLRA to circumvent established grievance procedures and separately picket their employer's store in furtherance of
their demand that their employer remedy alleged discrimination
against them. In upholding the employee's discharge, the Court
found the picketing tended to induce the employer to bargain with
someone other than the employees' exclusive representative. 83 Although national policy "embodies the principles of nondiscrimination
as a matter of highest priority,"18 4 the desire of the minority employees to negotiate directly with the employer could not undermine the
NLRA policy favoring exclusive bargaining representation. The
Board's legislatively mandated responsibility is the enforcement of
labor policies encased in the NLRA. 8 5
In NAACP v. Federal Power Commission,86 the Court analyzed
the statutory role of the Federal Power Commission (FPC) in the
administration of equal employment opportunity laws. The NAACP
petitioned the Commission to issue a rule requiring its regulatees to
adopt nondiscriminatory employment practices and affirmative action plans, and permit the filing of discriminatory practices complaints with the FPC. The Commission refused to issue the rule. The
Court agreed that the FPC's obligation of setting "just and reasonable rates" for the sale and transmission of electricity gave it power to
entertain evidence that a regulatee has practiced discrimination in
employment practices resulting in "illegal, duplicative, or unnecessary labor costs. 187 The Court, nevertheless, rejected the argument
181. 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
182. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-16 (1976).
183. 420 U.S. at 57-58; see also Emporium, 192 N.L.R.B. 173, 173 n.2 (1971).
184. 420 U.S. at 66.
185. For an analysis of the statutory mandate of the NLRA in connection with
racially motivated employment discrimination see Axelrod & Kaufman, Mansion House-

Bekins-Handy Andy: The National Labor Relations Board's Role in Racial Discrimination Cases, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 675, 682-688 (1977).

186. 425 U.S. 662 (1976).
187.

Id. at 668.

that the Commission's statutory duty to act in the "public interest"
required the FPC to oversee all aspects of the regulatee's labor relations. In ascertaining the accommodation to be accorded civil rights
concerns, the agency must look to its enabling legislation.1 88 The
statutes or their legislative history must evince a congressional intent
that the elimination of employment discrimination be a primary
agency goal.
In this light, a more substantive evaluation of the accommodation
to be accorded immigration matters by the NLRB can be offered.
First, a worker's illegal status may constitute a violation of immigration law but that does not by itself prevent the NLRB from making
a determination that the worker is an employee under the statutes
and policies entrusted to it. The existence of common facts, moreover, does not diminish the agency's responsibility to make an independent analysis of the question. Second, even though the regulation
of immigration may be of highest national priority, the Board must
still interpret and enforce its statutes with regard to its established
policy - a policy it has determined to be furthered by the inclusion
of these workers. Third, the primary responsibility of the NLRB is
to carry out its legislative mission, and the Board must look to its
statute and legislative history to determine its role in immigration
matters. An analysis of these areas fails to yield support for the notion that immigration regulation was a primary agency goal.
When the question at hand is analyzed under the principles of accommodation, no compelling legal justification exists for the noncoverage of undocumented workers. Even if section 212(a)(14) is understood to prohibit the employment of undocumented persons, that
determination should not be mechanically carried over to a labor law
analysis. Rather, the Board still has the obligation to determine
whether its goal of promoting the free flow of commerce is furthered
by their coverage under the NLRA. Furthermore, irrespective of the
national concern with immigration, the Board must apply its own
policy in determining such threshold questions as employee status.
Finally, ever mindful of the need to minimize interference with immigration law, the Board must fulfill its legislative mandate; nothing
in its statutes or legislative history makes the regulation of immigrant labor a primary agency concern. The NLRB's policy of conferring employee status to undocumented workers is well within the
principles of accommodation, and Southern S.S. Co. is more apposite in determining the availability of certain Board remedies than in
supporting the argument for the wholesale non-protection of these
workers.

188.

Id. See Axelrod & Kaufman, supra note 185, at 687.
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Unfair Labor Practices:Sure-Tan II
On February 24, 1982, the Seventh Circuit issued a decision in
the case of NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc.,189 (Sure-Tan II) which dealt
with the "bogeymen" of unfair labor practices and appropriate remedies in situations involving undocumented workers. The opinion in
Sure-Tan II offers an excellent opportunity to summarize the arguments presented in this work, and to briefly trace the court's reasoning in finding section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) violations. More importantly, the set of three remedies proposed by the administrative law
judge (ALJ), the Board, and the Seventh Circuit afford us an opportunity to explore the "knotty
problem of rectifying the injustice done
' 1 90
certain of these aliens.
On February 22 and March 23, 1977, the Regional Director for
Region 13 issued complaints against Sure-Tan, charging it with violations of sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(4) of the NLRA. The
complaint alleged that Sure-Tan had discriminatorily discharged five
employees because of their union activities; threatened, interrogated,
and coerced its employees to discourage them from engaging in protected activities; and discriminatorily reprimanded an employee who
filed a complaint with the Board.1 91 The ALJ upheld the complaints
in all respects, and the NLRB affirmed but modified the backpay
and reinstatement remedy. The Seventh Circuit found that substantial evidence supported the Board's order; however, it too modified
the remedy.
Section 8(a)(1) and Undocumented Workers
The ALJ found numerous occasions when John Surak, part owner
of Sure-Tan, Inc., threatened, coerced, and interrogated various employees about their union support. On at least two occasions Surak
approached employees with a piece of paper with squares marked
"yes" and "no." Surak pointed to the "yes" square and said, "Union
no good. Little work." Pointing to the "no" square, he stated, "[T]he
Company is good. A lot of work here. 192 Moreover, two hours after
the election on December 10, 1976, Surak addressed a group of employees exclaiming "no friends, no amigos" and using the word
"immigration."
189. 672 F.2d 592 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3646 (U.S. Mar. 7,
1983) (No. 82-945).
190. Id. at 595.
191. Id. at 596; see also Sure-Tan, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 1187, 1189 (1978).
192. 672 F.2d at 596.

The court dismissed the company's contention that the ALJ erred
by crediting the testimony of the employees. The only evidence rebutting their testimony was Surak's "uncorroborated and self-serving
declarations." The court noted it would reverse the Board for accepting an ALJ's credibility determinations only when such findings
are inherently incredible, unreasonable, or in conflict with the clear
preponderance of the evidence. 193 Surak's uncorroborated denials, it
held, did not meet this standard.
The court then held that Sure-Tan's argument that Surak's statement did not amount to a section 8(a)(1) violation was "similarly
without merit." 19 ' Citing NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,195 the opinion stated that while free to predict the economic consequences of
unionization, an employer "threatens" his employees when he warns
of a negative economic impact without offering an objective basis for
the employees to believe the predicted result is not caused solely at
the employer's initiative. The court concluded the ALJ was more
than justified in holding that Surak's instruction to his employees
constituted a threat within the radius of section 8(a)(1).196 Addition-

ally, the ALJ correctly concluded that Surak improperly interrogated his employees. The court observed that employer questioning
may have reasonably induced fear in the workers, causing them to
refrain from assisting a union. It held:
Surak's questions about union support, followed by ethnic slurs, inquiries
into the employees' immigration status, occasional ascriptions of canine ancestry and other expressions of Surak's anti-union animus are unarguable
97
and flagrant examples of interrogation prohibited by section 8(a)(1).1

Constructive Discharge and INS
The issue of whether Sure-Tan discriminatorily discharged five
employees, the court said, turns on an analysis of "constructive discharge" and posits the direct question whether employer disclosure
of irregular immigration status of his employees to the INS could
constitute an unfair labor practice.
On January 17, 1977, the Regional Director overruled Sure-Tan's
objections to the representation election and certified the union as
the collective bargaining agent for its employees. A day after receiv193. Id. at 597. The ALJ discredited what he considered Surak's hesitant and evasive testimony. The court then noted that after their review of the hearing transcript,
they could not conclude that the "ALJ erred in discrediting Surak's uncorroborated and
self-serving declarations."
194. Id.
195.

395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969); see also NLRB v. Gogin, 575 F.2d 596, 600-01

(7th Cir. 1978) (interrogation need not be explicitly threatening to be "coercive" under
the meaning of the Act).
196. 672 F.2d at 597.
197. Id.
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ing notice of this decision, January 20, 1977, Surak sent a letter to
INS requesting an immigration check of five listed employees. INS
agents visited Sure-Tan premises on February 18, 1977, to investi-

gate the immigration status of all Spanish-speaking employees. INS
agents arrested the five employees listed for being present in the

country illegally. By the end of that day each of the employees, hav-

ing accepted a grant of voluntary departure, 1'9 8 was on his way to

Mexico.
Sure-Tan countered the Board's finding of constructive discharge

in violation of section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) by arguing that at the
time the letter was sent Surak had only "doubts" about his employ-

ees' immigration status. Moreover, the "deportation" of these workers was a "proximate result" of their illegal status rather than

Surak's letter to the INS. 19 9 The court rejected Sure-Tan's conten-

tions and affirmed the Board's determination that Sure-Tan's action

amounted to constructive discharge.
The court found the great weight of evidence supported the

Board's finding that Surak was fully aware of his employees' illegal
status in the country.20 0 The court began its refutation of the "myth

'1 by noting Surak's conduct before and after
of employer naivete" 20
the election clearly reflected a bald anti-union animus. This evidence
of contemporaneous unfair labor practices, the court stated, is highly
relevant in establishing motive under section 8(a)(3). 20 The court
then surveyed the record and found ample factual evidence demonstrating Surak's knowledge of the workers' immigration status. First,
employees told Surak hours after the election that none of the employees possessed the proper immigration papers. Second, Surak exe198. Id. at 599 n.11. The court stated: "Contrary to the apparent assumption of
the ALJ, the Board, the General Counsel and counsel for Sure-Tan, these employees
were not deported but instead left the country on a grant of voluntary departure." (Emphasis in original).
199. Id. at 599.
200. Id. The court acknowledged that in order to establish a section 8(a)(3) violation, "the employer's conduct affecting an employee's hire, tenure or terms of employment must be motivated, at least in part, by anti-union considerations."
201. Counsel for Sure-Tan attempted to avail himself of the "myth of employer
naivete" by arguing the Surak brothers did not know of their workers' illegal status (although they did entertain "doubts"). Consequently, when the brothers informed the INS
of the workers' immigration status it was due to a sense of civic obligation and not because of anti-union animus. For a discussion of the "myth of employer naivete" see supra
note 76.
202. See NLRB v. Tom Wood Pontiac, Inc., 447 F.2d 383, 386 (7th Cir. 1971)
(unfair labor practices were "proper" and "highly significant" factors in determining
motive); see also NLRB v. Gogin, 575 F.2d 596, 604 (7th Cir. 1978) (prior conduct and
anti-union animus are important factors in ascertaining motive).

cuted an affidavit, ten days before his letter to INS, stating a confidential source told him several months before the election that
"these men were illegally here."203 Finally, Surak's counsel at the
time of the election twice admitted in statements filed with the
Board in December 1976 that one of the grounds for objecting to the
election was that six of the workers were illegally in the country. 2 4
The company also challenged the finding of a section 8(a)(3) violation by contending that the letter to the INS did not amount to a
"constructive discharge." The court stated "Constructive discharge
occurs, and may give rise to a section 8(a)(3) violation, even though
the employer does not directly or forthrightly terminate an employee
but rather creates working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced to resign. ' 20 5 The court noted that two elements are
required to establish constructive discharge in violation of section
8(a)(3). "First, the employer's conduct must have created working
conditions so intolerable that an employee is forced to resign. Second, the employer must have acted 'to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization' within the meaning of section
8(a)(3). '2 0
The court labeled as "specious" Sure-Tan's argument that the alleged status of the workers created the intolerable conditions forcing
termination of employment. The court observed:
By putting the INS on notice of these alien employees when it knew of their
illegal status, Sure-Tan took action which was the proximate cause of their
departure. Indeed, the INS agent who conducted the investigation testified
that John Surak's letter "precipitated" his inspection and investigation.
Surak, when he sent this letter, surely foresaw and intended the ultimate
result of the INS' investigation. .

Additionally, the court rebuffed Sure-Tan's assertion that it was legally obligated to disclose the presence of alien employees to the
INS. The INA is barren, the court held, of any provision requiring
an employer to notify the INS that he employs undocumented workers. 208 Moreover, "an employer has no right to rely on a 'moral obli203. 672 F.2d at 600.
204. Id. at 600 n.12. The notion that Surak did not know the immigration status of
his workers, the court concluded, "borders on the ludicrous when considered in connection with the prior affidavits of fact."
205. Id. at 600. See also Cartwright Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 600 F.2d 268 (10th
Cir. 1979) (constructive discharge found when an employer creates intolerable working
conditions).
206. 672 F.2d at 600 (citing NLRB v. Haberman Constr. Co., 641 F.2d 351, 358
(5th Cir. 1981) (en banc)).
207. 672 F.2d at 601.
208. Id. at 601 n.13. The opinion reads:
[A]n alien's illegal status under the INA does not, as Sure-Tan contends, immunize an employer's constructive dismissal of an alien employee which is motivated by anti-union animus. Although an alien's inability to procure proper authorization from the INS to reside and work in the United States might,
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gation' to report [undocumented workers] (of which he has been previously oblivious) merely to sanctify an otherwise unjustifiable
violation of section 8(a)(3). 20 9
The second prong of the Haberman test-that the employer has
acted with anti-union animus - was also easily met. The employer's
conduct had resulted in section 8(a)(1), 8(a)(3), and 8(a)(5) violations which evidenced an illegal course of action tending to discourage its employees from supporting the union. The close time relationship between the receipt of the certification notice and the letter to

the INS also illustrated Sure-Tan's motives. The court wrote:
Sure-Tan's deathbed conversion to enthusiastic enforcement of the immigration laws, which, of course, coincided with the Union's victory in the
representation election, can hardly provide it with any defense under section
8(a)(3). In fact, in this case as probably in others the immigration laws
have provided an employer with a powerful tool for unfair and oppressive
treatment of migrant labor. The immigration laws have been conveniently
employed to impose the ultimate penalty of discharge (and deportation or
its equivalent)
if migrant laborers should have the effrontery to join a
o
unio 1

The opinion made clear that an employer's transparent appeal to

"civic duty" and "moral obligation" under the INA cannot justify
conduct directed toward discouraging undocumented workers from

assisting or supporting a labor organization. The court candidly recognized the reality of this clandestine labor market where there is

"nothing like a successful union election to concentrate an em-

ployer's mind on the color of its workers' visas (if they exist) and on

its moral obligations to expel its (once faithful) employees from the
standing alone, constitute sufficient grounds for discharge, there is no authority
under either the NLRA or the INA sanctioning a constructive discharge which
is otherwise invalid under section 8(a)(3), based on the employee's status as an
[undocumented worker]. Even if the instant case could properly be classified as
a "mixed motive" case because of the presence of a potentially justifiable reason
for the constructive discharge, we believe that the General Counsel clearly sustained his burden of demonstrating an illegal motive under the Act for SureTan's conduct, and Sure-Tan has not rebutted this evidence. Specifically, SureTan has not shown that absent anti-union animus, it would have engineered
these employees' departures ....
209. Id. at 601. The court went on to observe:
We are not so naive as to believe that Sure-Tan does not share some practical
blame in this case for any alleged violation of the immigration laws. We find it
difficult to believe that a metropolitan Chicago employer can employ a work
force almost exclusively made up of Spanish-speaking men of Mexican origin at
wages within pennies of the minimum wage (and at hard and unappetizing
work) without even suspecting that some of these employees are [undocumented
workers].
Id. at 601 n.14.
210. Id. at 602.

country."2"'
Sure-Tan, in its brief before the Supreme Court, advanced a First
2 12
Amendment defense against the finding of constructive discharge.
Relying on the recently decided case of Bill Johnson's Restaurants,
Inc. v. NLRB, 1 the company contends that its request that INS
investigate the immigration status of its workers is a protected exercise of its right to petition the government for redress. Hence, its
instigation of an INS investigation, even if prompted by a retaliatory
motive, cannot be construed as constructive discharge because it was
constitutionally protected given that a reasonable basis exists for the
initial communication with the INS.
The company's reliance on Bill Johnson as authority for its "right
to petition" argument is misplaced. In that case, the Supreme Court
was presented with the issue of whether the Board could enjoin the
prosecution of a state court civil suit brought by an employer for
retaliatory purposes, without a finding that the suit lacked reasonable basis. 2 4 The Court noted that sections 8(a)(1) and (4) are
"broad, remedial provisions that guarantee that employees will be
able to enjoy their rights secured by [section] 7 of the Act .
The opinion, however, recognized the existence of "weighty countervailing" considerations against allowing the NLRB to find that the
filing of the suit was an unfair labor practice. The Court was sensitive to the First Amendment values encased in the right to petition
for both the individual and the states. With respect to the individual,
the abridgement of judicial access by NLRB injunction "will totally
[deprive the person] of a remedy for an actual injury. 21' 6 Additionally, the states have a substantial interest "in protecting the health
and well-being of its citizens. 2 17 Because of these concerns, the
Board will be allowed to enjoin a state civil action only where the
suit lacks a reasonable basis.
The Sure-Tan facts are readily distinguishable from the operative
facts and legal concerns of Bill Johnson. First, the company cannot
cite an "actual injury" for which redress is necessary. The undocumented workers' presence in the country cannot reasonably be construed as injurious to the company. Second, the underlying federalism concerns that form the Bill Johnson decision are totally absent
in this case. Even assuming a generalized First Amendment right to
report "illegal aliens," that right is only narrowly limited to the ex211.
212.

Id. at 601 n.14.
For a summary of Sure-Tan's argument see 52 U.S.L.W. 3204 (U.S. Sept. 7,

1983) (No. 82-945).
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

51 U.S.L.W: 4636 (1983) (U.S. May 31, 1983) (No. 81-2257).
Id.
Id. at 4638.
Id. at 4639 (emphasis added).
Id. (citing Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 302-303 (1977)).
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tent its exercise directly constitutes an unfair labor practice. The employer is not otherwise restricted by labor law from requesting an
INS investigation of his workers. Consequently, Bill Johnson does
not immunize Sure-Tan's actions from a constructive discharge
finding.
Remedies and Undocumented Workers
The most difficult issue presented in Sure Tan H is the problem of
fashioning an appropriate remedy for the five constructively discharged employees. In sharp contrast to the AL's, Board's, and
Seventh Circuit's concurrence of analyses with regard to employee
status and the unfair labor practices, all three tribunals diverged in
formulating the appropriate remedy. The various administrative
remedies will be briefly reviewed, and the Seventh Circuit's opinion
will be analyzed in some detail.
The ALJ started with the basic premise that undocumented workers are employees within the meaning of the NLRA and are entitled
to the conventional remedies of backpay and reinstatement. 218 These
remedies, however, seemed "inadequate since being physically unavailable for employment nullifies any backpay liability and their inability to return to the United States renders reinstatement at best
an unlikely prospect. 21 '9 The ALJ presumed that "illegal aliens"
were unavailable for work because of their voluntary departure;
nonetheless, he ordered reinstatement to remain open for six months
so that the workers could be given an opportunity to return legally.22 0 The ALJ declined to award backpay but invited the Board
to consider the awarding of limited backpay because, in part, "without an award of some backpay, the violations herein will largely go
unremedied and the Employer may be encouraged to adopt an apparently foolproof system of defeating union organizational
218. Sure-Tan, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 1187, 1192 (1978).
219. Id. The ALJ appears to have indulged in a conclusory legal presumption that
the deported workers could not return under proper legal authority and that their "physi-

cal" availability (irrespective of legal status) was not sufficient to trigger the remedial
provisions of the NLRA.
220. Given the immense backlog in processing Mexican visa applications, the notion that these workers could return legally within six months verges on the ridiculous.
See generally SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE PoLIcy, STAFF REPORT,
U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST § III (1981) (noting
"[b]acklogs for some groups from certain countries mean delays of over a decade...")
Id. at 355. Immigrants seeking legal admission from Mexico are particularly susceptible
to long delays.

attempts. 2 2 1
The Board differed with the ALJ as to the appropriate remedy.2 22
The NLRB took issue with the AL's departure from conventional
remedies for section 8(a)(3) violations, and deemed his analysis of
the remedy as "unnecessarily speculative. ' 228 The Board noted that
while it was not disputed that the employees were deported, nevertheless, the record was devoid of evidence establishing that they had
not returned to the United States. The Board refrained from determining the exact scope of remedies, instead it held that the appropriate forum to determine the availability of the worker and the proper
remedy was the compliance proceeding.
Operational Conflict
On September 7, 1978, the General Counsel filed a Motion for
Clarification,22 4 contending the Board's Order did not distinguish between the legal and the illegal status of the discriminatees and thus
was inconsistent with national immigration law and policy. The General Counsel argued the Board's order encouraged the deported employees to return to claim their jobs and backpay in violation of
United States immigration law. Consequently, reinstatement should
be offered only to discriminatees who are able to re-enter the United
States legally, and backpay should accrue only from the time a lawfully returned worker is denied employment.
The General Counsel, of course, conceded this restrictive reading
of the Board's relief would leave only the cease-and-desist provisions
as a remedy in most cases involving deportation.2 25 The General
Counsel advanced the argument that a conflict between the NLRA
and the INA exists at the "operational level. '226 This "operational"
conflict argument holds that if a Board remedy induces undocumented workers to re-enter the country in violation of INA criminal
sanctions, 2 then the labor award and the INS enforcement policy
221. 234 N.L.R.B. at 1193.
222. Id. at 1187. The Board observed that while the ALJ commenced his analysis
with the settled proposition that undocumented workers are employees within the meaning of the Act, nevertheless, his recommended "Order departs significantly from the conventional remedy for a violation of Section 8(a)(3)."
223. Id.
224. See Sure-Tan, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 788 (1979).
225. Id.
226. See generally Note, RetaliatoryReporting of Illegal Alien Employees: Remedying the Labor-ImmigrationConflict, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1296 (1980).
227. INA § 275, 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1982). The INA provision said to be violated
by a labor award that induces deported workers to re-enter the United States reads in

pertinent part as follows:

An alien who (1) enters the United States at any time or place other than as
designated by immigration officers, or (2) eludes examination or inspection by
immigration officers, or (3) obtains entry to the United States by a willfully
false or misleading representation or the willful concealment of a material fact,
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are in conflict. Because of its limiting affect on the Board's use of
traditional remedies, the exact premises and scope of the argument
must be ascertained.
The "operational" conflict argument is premised on the notion
that an undocumented worker's reentry is a violation of criminal law
and significantly impedes INS enforcement efforts. First, section 275
of the INA states that an immigrant who enters without inspection
may be subject to conviction of a misdemeanor. 2 8 Only if the alien
is convicted and re-enters is the uninspected entry deemed a felony.
Since in the vast majority of cases Mexican undocumented workers
are deported without prosecution under section 275, the possibility of
re-entry constituting a felony is insignificant. This points out the fact
that INS enforcement policy is not focused on enforcing section 275.
Of the 896,929 persons apprehended in 1979, only 12,371 were convicted of illegal entry. 2 9 Second, the surreptitous entry does not necessarily mean the immigrant is in violation of criminal law once he
arrives in the interior. As noted by the court in United States v.
Rincon-Jimenez,3 0 once the alien has perfected entry, the violation
may cease. 3 Consequently, an undocumented immigrant who has
reached the interior of the United States is in all likelihood not in
violation of this provision. 32 Third, the "operational" conflict between the INA and the NLRA is limited to cases in which the discriminatee workers have actually been deported and returned without inspection. If the workers still remain in the United States, the
application of section 275 is precluded. In Apollo Tire, for example,
the discharged workers were not deported nor was the INS directly
involved. Additionally, even if deported, workers can return to the
shall, for the first commission of any such offenses, be guilty of a misdemeanor
...and for a subsequent commission of any such offenses shall be guilty of a
felony ....
228. Id.
229.

1979

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

15, 21.
230. 595 F.2d 1192 (9th Cir. 1979).

231. In determining that a conviction for section 275(2) was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the court noted that the offense was "consumated at the time
the alien gains entry .

. . ."

Id. at 1193-1194. The court explicitly declined to make

violation of section 275 a continuing offense. Id. at 1194.
232. Note, Illegal Aliens And Enforcement: Present PracticesAnd ProposedLegislation,8 U.C.D. L. REV. 127, 148-149 (1975). Noting that section 275 does not make
"illegal" presence a crime, the author states: "Since being in the United States 'illegally'
is neither a felony nor a misdemeanor, an alien who is apprehended after having completed entry into the country is only subject to deportation, not criminal prosecution."
(Citations omitted).

United States under a temporary legal arrangement. They could acquire an illegal status by overstaying the authorized visa period without necessarily violating section 275.233
The scope of the operational conflict argument is limited to a set
of specific remedies that impel the violation of an INA criminal provision. This contention presupposes that the immigration law concerns surrounding section 275 are settled and unambiguous. This
simplistic presumption, however, fails to account for the lack of INS
enforcement of the provision and for the complexities of whether an
undocumented person's presence in the interior of the country constitutes a continuing violation of that section. Hence, the Board has
demonstrated well-founded caution in declining to enter this area of
immigration law.
The Board rejected the General Counsel's argument, noting the
charging party's counter-argument that without adequate remedies
the employer could simply replenish his work force with other undocumented workers, thus creating a strong incentive for illegal immigration. The NLRB denied the motion concluding the "remedial
policies of the Act will be best effectuated

. . .

by affording the dis-

criminatees full protection notwithstanding the circumstances attendant to their illegal discharge." 2 " The discriminatees were to be
offered unconditional reinstatement and the backpay period was to
run from the discriminatory loss of employment to the bona fide reinstatement offer or other appropriate tolling of that liability. Employees who were located but found to be unavailable for work (including unavailability because of enforced absence from the country)
23 5
would have their backpay tolled.

The Board noted the Apollo Tire court enforced its reinstatement
and backpay order without regard to the fact that the workers were
in the country unlawfully. Moreover, this was consistent with that
court's admonition that the Board not "delve into immigration matters, out of its field of expertise. 236 Additionally, the NLRB felt the
Court in Southern S.S. Co. found an abuse of discretion because the
congressional intent underlying the anti-mutiny statute was clear
and unambiguous and the strikers' criminal conduct held a serious
potential for violence. Such was not the case here, so its order for
"reinstatement and compliance hearing to develop a factual record is
not so incompatible with immigration law so as to render it an abuse
233. The entry into the United States under inspection and pursuant to an authorized nonimmigrant classification, could result in a deportable status if the conditions and
time periods of the visa are not observed. Therefore, a person could have an illegal status
without having violated section 275.
234. Sure-Tan, Inc., 246 N.L.R.B. 788, 788 (1979).
235. Id. (citing 3 NLRB CASEHANDLING MANUAL § 10584.2 (1977)).
236. 246 N.L.R.B. at 788 n.7; see also NLRB v. Apollo Tire Co., 604 F.2d 1180,
1183 (9th Cir. 1979).
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of [its] discretionary
authority under the rule of Southern
23 7
Steamship."
The Sure-Tan H court initiated its analysis of the remedy issue by
discussing the propriety of backpay and reinstatement in situations
involving deported discriminatees. The court rejected the company's
argument that an award of reinstatement and backpay "cannot be
reconciled with the laws and policies governing both immigration
and labor relations. ' 23 8 Sure-Tan's argument was premised on the
assumption that the discriminatees were deported, and thus the
Board's order encouraged re-entry which would constitute a felony
under immigration provisions." 9 The court correctly pointed out,
however, that the INS did not deport the workers; rather, the INS
granted them voluntary departure with the result that the INA felony provisions for re-entry were inapplicable.24 0 The importance of a
grant of voluntary departure is that the return of the discriminatees
does not place them in violation of felony criminal provisions. Even
though the Board's remedies did not require the commission of a
criminal act by the discriminatees, it is nevertheless contended that
the very existence of these remedies fuels violations of misdemeanor
INA provisions and regulations by encouraging re-entry. The court
addressed this issue as follows:
[A]s a practical matter we believe it unlikely that a discriminatee would
attempt to illegally enter the United States primarily to pursue his remedies
and thus draw attention to his [undocumented] status. Indeed, the economic
and social attractions which generally encourage illegal immigration to this
country are probably more compelling inducements than the special fruit of
the Board's order might be in this case.'"

The purposes of the NLRA, Sure-Tan then asserted, were not furthered by the imposition of these remedies. The company drew attention to a line of cases which denied reinstatement to employees
237. 246 N.L.R.B. at 789. For a discussion of the rule of Southern Steamship Co.
see supra text accompanying notes 168-179.
238.

NLRB v. Sure-Tan, Inc., 672 F.2d 592, 603 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. granted,51

U.S.L.W. 3646 (U.S. Mar. 7, 1983) (No. 82-945).
239. 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1982). Deported aliens must first obtain the Attorney General's consent for reapplication for admission before they can re-enter the United States.
Failure to comply with this provision makes subsequent re-entry a felony.
240. 672 F.2d at 603. The court reasoned as follows:
[T]he INS did not deport the discriminatees; rather, the INS granted to them
the privilege of voluntary departure .

. .

. Aliens who depart voluntarily avoid

the stigma of deportation and enhance the possibility of their lawful return to
the United States at a later date ....

Because these discriminatees were not

deported, the felony provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 are not applicable ....
(Citations omitted)(emphasis in original).
241. 672 F.2d at 603-604.

guilty of unlawful or offensive behavior. 42 The court explained, however, that the offensive or unlawful behavior must have a direct
nexus to the employee's ability to perform work responsibilities or to
the compatability between the employer and the worker. The court
determined that discriminatees' immigration transgressions, though
unlawful and possibly offensive, do not relate directly to their ability
to perform work, nor do they adversely affect employer-employee
relations.
Furthermore, the court emphasized that the purpose of backpay is
to vindicate public policy by making employees whole for their losses
caused by the employer's unfair labor practices. 4 3 The court went
on to state:
It would be anomalous to encourage the honest toil of [undocumented
workers] accepting it with the understanding that these workers had the
rights of employees under the Act, but then, when violations occur, to deny
them such rights by refusing effective remedies. Indeed, the rights of both
alien and non-alien employees under the Act are flouted if employers are
free to discriminate against alien employees who exercise their right to form
and join unions.24

Noting that this was precisely what happened in Sure-Tan II, the

court affirmed that both reinstatement and backpay were justified to
advance the policy of the NLRA and to deter similar misconduct in
the future.245 This conventional remedy, the court cautioned, must
nevertheless be subject to limitations given the peculiar immigration
status of the discriminatees.
Mandatory Backpay and Legal Presence
The court, in analyzing whether Sure-Tan's offer of reinstatement
was conditional or unconditional, reached the conclusion that the
Board's reinstatement order must be modified. Sure-Tan had mailed
letters to the discriminatees offering to reinstate the discriminatees
"provided . .. [their] reemployment shall not subject Sure-Tan,
Inc., to any violations of United States immigration laws."2 46 The
ALJ found the offer deficient because it afforded the employees only
twenty days or less to legally enter the United States to reclaim their
jobs and because there was no evidence to verify that the workers
received the offer. 247 The Board found "the [employer's] offers were

242. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939); Nebraska Bulk Transport v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Nat'l Furniture Mfg. Co., 315 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1963). For an analogous argument see Comment,
Illegal Aliens as "Employees" under the National Labor Relations Act, 68 GEO. L.J.
851, 866-869 (1980).
243. 672 F.2d at 604.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 604.
247. Sure-Tan, Inc., 234 N.L.R.B. 1187, 1192 (1978).
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deficient because they were expressly conditioned on [Sure-Tan] not

being found in violation of United States immigration law.

248

The Seventh Circuit Court reasoned that Sure-Tan was correct in
arguing that the condition in its letter was not a legal impediment to
reinstatement. The discriminatees could be hired without placing the
company in violation of United States immigration laws. Moreover,
in determining whether a reinstatement offer is conditional, the focus
is on the "understanding of an alleged condition by discriminatees
who received the reinstatement offers. 2 4 9 In this case, the court held
the discriminatees were cognizant that they needed proper authorization to work in the United States; thus, the condition in "SureTan's letter would in all likelihood be construed by persons in the
position of these discriminatees as requiring them to enter the country legally before seeking reinstatement. ' 2 50 From this premise the
court extrapolated that reinstatement would be required only if the
discriminatees are legally present and duly authorized to be em-

ployed. The court, nonetheless, ordered that the reinstatement offer
remain open for seven years because it could take years to secure

legal entry. Noting that under the circumstances the discriminatees
may not be entitled to any backpay, the court stated:
It seems to us that it would better effectuate the policies of the Act to set a
minimum amount of backpay which the employer must pay in any event,
because it was his discriminatory act which caused these employees to lose
their jobs ... [W]e think the Board could fix a time which is the minimum
during which the discriminatees might reasonably have remained employed
without apprehension by INS, but for the employer's unfair labor practice.
Although that period of time is obviously conjectural, we think that six
months is a reasonable assumption.1 51

The court concluded by affirmatively holding that six months of
backpay is a minimum amount to effectuate the policies of the

NLRA.
248. Id. at 1187 n.3.
249. 672 F.2d at 604.
250. The court's analysis of whether Sure-Tan's offer was "conditioned" does not
support its conclusion that the discriminatees "may not enter the United States to claim
these jobs without proper documents." Id. at 605-606. It is important to note that immigration law does not prohibit the employer from offering employment to an undocumented worker, nor does it sanction that worker for accepting it. Moreover, if the discriminatees in this case effectuate an illegal entry they have not committed a felony;
rather, they may have violated an INA misdemeanor provision and may be subject to
deportation. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324-1325 (1982). Although an undocumented worker remains subject to detention, there are no substantive INA provisions compelling the
worker to be "legally" in the country before availing himself of Board remedies.
251. 672 F.2d at 606.

Critique and Alternative Remedies
The remedy fashioned by the Sure-Tan II court is deficient because it is at once too sweeping and excessively narrow. The court
appears to dismiss the antinomy argument in its holding of NLRA
coverage and availability of conventional remedies to undocumented
laborers. In formulating the appropriate remedy, however, the court
seems to accept the notion of an "operational" conflict between the
NLRA and the INA. Without identifying the locus of this conflict,
the court derives a substantive legal requirement of lawful status
from the presumed understanding of the reinstatement offer by the
discriminatees. This requirement of legal presence unnecessarily limits the scope of conventional labor law remedies and is procedurally
and substantively suspect.
Under the Sure-Tan II rationale, relief in the form of reinstatement is practically denied to undocumented workers whose rights
under the NLRA have been violated. The preservation of the essential employer-employee relationship is promoted by reinstatement
which is in the nature of an "affirmative" remedy. This affirmative
remedy is effectively foreclosed because undocumented workers are
not likely to have the requisite familial or occupational nexus to the
United States that is required for permanent resident alien status.
Furthermore, even with proper legal basis for an immigration claim,
INS bureaucratic lethargy252 as well as the visa backlog will result
in the undocumented worker not being able to secure legal status
even within the seven years prescribed by the court. Hence, the
court's remedy, allowing for reinstatement within seven years if legal
presence is established, is ineffective.
The reinstatement remedy is too narrow to accomplish its purpose
of making the employee "whole." At a minimum the remedy should
allow for the continuation of the reinstatement obligation until such
time as the alien has acquired legal status. Using a procedure parallel to that developed for employees whose enlistment in the armed
services precludes immediate reinstatement, the reinstatement offer
should remain open for ninety days after legal admittance. 53 The
employee must apply for reinstatement within that time period and
the employer is obligated to respond with a reinstatement offer
within five days. This approach has the virtue of keeping the reinstatement
offer open until the discriminatee is in a position to accept
it.25
252. See the recent Supreme Court case which held that an 18-month INS delay
in rendering a decision in an 1-130 application is not affirmative misconduct justifying an

estoppel. Miranda v. INS, 51 U.S.L.W. 3358 (1982).
253. See Note, supra note 226, at 1310; see also 3 NLRB
UAL § 10528.14 (1977).
254.

CASEHANDLING MAN-

Board policy does not allow the setting of rigid general deadlines for the ac-
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The legal presence prerequisite also complicates the backpay portion of conventional labor law remedies. In most instances the apprehended undocumented worker would be almost immediately unavailable because of forced absence from the country, thus tolling
backpay liability. For the reasons listed above, it will probably be
difficult to acquire legal status and become reavailable. Consequently, the undocumented discriminatee could be left without any
remedy. Perceiving this possibility, the court correctly imposed a
mandatory backpay remedy. The six-month backpay period appears
to meet the conflicting legal dictates of the NLRA. The award seems
to be large enough to substantially restore status quo, yet not so
large as to be oppressive under the circumstances. 255 The award can
be empirically justified as representing the general time period that
most undocumented workers remain employed in this country before
departing to Mexico.
The legal presence requirement with authorized employment imposed by the Sure-Tan II court is too sweeping given the posture of
the case and the doctrine of accommodation. Unfair labor proceedings are usually bifurcated into distinct stages, and issues germane to
one stage may not be relevant in another.256 In the initial stage, the
Board makes policy determinations and ascertains culpability. 257 In
the second stage, the so-called "compliance" proceeding, the Board
usually calculates the backpay owed and passes on unresolved reinstatement issues.
The Sure-Tan II case involved the first stage of the unfair labor
proceeding. The court properly discussed issues of coverage and the
availability and propriety of remedies. After deciding these issues in
ceptance of reinstatement offers. Rather, it requires that each discriminatee be given
sufficient time to accept the offer in view of the particular circumstances of each case. 3
NLRB CASEHANDLING MANUAL § 10528.14 (1977).
255. The Supreme Court has suggested that the requirement that remedies be
fashioned to effectuate the policy of the NLRA precludes backpay awards that are oppressive under the circumstances. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349
(1953).
256. See e.g., Handy Andy Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 447 (1977) (holding that evidence
of past practices of racial discrimination by a union need not be considered at a certification proceeding; the Board noted such allegations could best be handled in an unfair
labor practice proceeding), approved in Bell & Howell Co. v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 136
(D.C. Cir.) (Bazelon, J.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942 (1979); Local Union No. 393,
United Assoc. of Journeymen & Apprentices, 232 N.L.R.B. 644 (1977) (holding that
evidence of discrimination need not be considered in §§ 8(b)(4)(D) and 10(k) work dispute proceedings; the Board again urged that unfair labor practice proceedings provide a
more suitable setting for such allegations).
257. National Labor Relations Act, § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976). See
NLRB v. Deena Artware, Inc., 361 U.S. 398, 411 (1960) (Frankfurt, J., concurring).
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favor of coverage and recognizing the general applicability of conventional remedies, the court then attempted to address the immigration issues by imposing a general legal presence requirement.
While this requirement can be cast as a "policy" question, the conflict between immigration law and particular labor law remedies
should only be assessed at a forum where the concrete facts can be
adduced. This minimizes the need for Board interpretation of immigration law, and it places any needed construction of the INA within
a frame of specific facts.
The Sure-Tan H court's legal presence requirement is deficient in
several regards. First, the legal basis for the requirement is vague
and tenuous. The precise areas of conflict need to be specifically defined so the rights of undocumented workers under the NLRA can
be fully protected within the limitations imposed by immigration
law. Second, the legal presence with authorization to work requirement could result in the denial of these remedies to undocumented
aliens who are in the2 country
under color of law but who are not
"authorized" to work. 58 Also, what constitutes legal presence with
authorization to work can be a complicated legal determination
which the Board is ill-prepared to render. Moreover, it will not do to
defer these questions to the INS because they may take years to
issue a decision which, in some cases, may be further delayed by
appeals. Finally, the legal presence requirement is not supported by
the doctrine of accommodation. The Board has the duty to be attentive to the mandates of the NLRA and to issue remedies that effectuate the policy of the Act. The traditional remedies of backpay and
reinstatement, which the court found were available in this context,
should be used and modified only to the extent there is an "actual"
conflict between the remedy and the INA. This can only be determined at a compliance proceeding.
The Sure-Tan I court's analysis of the status and scope of protection of undocumented workers under the NLRA supports the formulation of a more coherent remedy than the one it advanced. The initial premise would be the well-supported principle that
undocumented workers are to be treated like other protected workers. Because the general policy issues would be set, the initial stage
would involve the issue of culpability. At the compliance proceeding,
issues of immigration law conflict should be addressed. If workers
are not deported at that time, conflict between the NLRA and immigration law should not pose a problem. For workers who are deported, however, no prior immigration restrictions should be im258. See 8 C.F.R. § 109 (1983). Unauthorized employment goes to the issue of
deportability and not to questions of criminal violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
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posed. The legal presence requirement would compel the Board to
make complicated immigration determinations at the initial hearing,
before the exact nature of the conflict is determined. Instead of imposing a "legal" presence obligation on the worker, the burden
should be on the employer to establish that the discriminatee is currently in violation of an INA criminal provision or is violating any
applicable provision prohibiting his employment. General questions
of deportability are- not germane because INS enforcement is not
legally impeded by Board remedies. 59 If the remedy would cause the
worker to violate a specific criminal or employment prohibition, then
the remedy must be altered to eliminate the conflict. If the worker is
unable to attend the compliance proceeding because of forced absence from the country, then a six-month mandatory backpay remedy should be awarded for the reasons discussed above.
The guiding principle of this formulation would be the minimizing
of conflict between the NLRA and the INA by eschewing sweeping
requirements. While the Board must be attentive to "operational"
conflicts, it should delve into this matter only when an actual conflict
is presented by the facts of the case. The Board incursions into immigration matters would thus be limited to what is necessary, and
the economic rights of undocumented workers would be protected to
the fullest extent while still respecting the integrity and independence of the INA as required by the doctrine of accommodation.
CONCLUSION

A survey of social research. on the question of illegal migration
draws into question many of the popular misconceptions regarding
its alleged adverse impact. Empirical research has failed to substantiate the persistent claims that undocumented workers cause unemployment. The secondary labor market jobs performed by these
workers provide too little remuneration and opportunity for upward
mobility to be attractive to native workers. Additionally, improvement of wage levels and work conditions, which the undocumented
workers allegedly depress, may just as easily result in business shutdowns or mechanization, rather than greater job opportunities for
domestic workers or improved working conditions. Apocryphal notions about the untoward consequences of illegal migration should
259. See Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. INS, 640 F.2d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 1981)
(though aliens could exercise rights protected by the NLRA, that fact did not bear on
their deportability under immigration laws even if their employer's unfair labor practice
precipitated the discovery of illegal status).

not be allowed to color the legal analysis of such aliens' coverage and
protection under the NLRA.
The INS enforcement policy is focused on the workplace and is
infused with a potentially disruptive effect on concerted activity. In
numerous instances, the INS raids are timed to interfere with union
elections or are prompted by calls from employers disgruntled with
the workers' desire for a union. On other occasions, interference results from the INS general enforcement policy which was designed
to open employment opportunities.
Ascertaining the legal coverage and protection of undocumented
workers under the Act is complicated by the workers' ambiguous economic and social role in our society. The growing presence of these
workers in various industrial sectors, however, makes the determination of their rights increasingly urgent. The questions of whether undocumented workers are "employees" under the NLRA and, if so,
the appropriate relief to be extended to them for unfair labor practices, are critical in determining their effective rights under our labor
laws. This is especially true since the unionization of undocumented
workers could prove to be one of the most important developments in
immigration in this decade. The participation of undocumented
workers in trade unions could structurally alter their position in the
United States, giving them the institutional base from which to protect their economic and civil rights and from which to improve the
wages and working conditions of the secondary labor market.
The answer to the threshold question of whether undocumented
workers are "employees" within the NLRA determines whether
these workers will have meaningful participation in industrial life.
The Board has consistently maintained a policy of according aliens,
both legal and undocumented, employee status. Although characterized by undeveloped reasoning, the Board's decisions show an awareness that formal distinctions based on immigration status could potentially undermine the purposes of the Act. Both the Seventh and
the Ninth Circuits have affirmed the Board's longstanding and consistent policy of extending NLRA protection to undocumented workers. Both circuits were concerned with the ability of the employer to
immunize himself from unionization should undocumented workers
be excluded from coverage. If these workers were legally foreclosed
from forming or assisting unions, employers would be encouraged to
continue employing undocumented workers in order to subvert the
policies embodied in the NLRA. With regard to immigration-law
based objections to NLRA employee status, both courts held that
the NLRA and the INA were not inconsistent. The INA does not
prohibit undocumented persons from working nor does it prevent an
employer from hiring them. Both opinions expressly held that refusing to protect undocumented workers under the NLRA would pro-
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vide an extra incentive for continued INA violations. Critics of these
opinions, nevertheless, vigorously argue that the courts' initial acceptance of the policy consonance between the NLRA and INA is
fallacious. Rather, a basic antinomy exists between the policies of
the INA, which is concerned with safeguarding domestic labor, and
the current Board policy of extending protection to foreign workers.
The antinomy argument is deficient because of its confused interpretation of immigration law and its misguided understanding of the
doctrine of accommodation. Advocates of this argument construe
section 212(a)(14) of the INA as creating a presumption that an
alien employed within the United States is illegal absent compliance
with that provision. The fundamental flaw with this contention is
that section 212(a)(14) is given a scope and meaning for labor law
purposes which it does not command in immigration law. This section deals with the exclusion of aliens, an area in which Congress has
been given wide latitude. Aliens who have entered the country, however, are not subject to exclusion provisions and have been accorded
rights in both deportation and non-deportation settings. Proponents
of the antinomy position attempt to prohibit the employment of undocumented workers by drawing a "presumption" from a non-applicable INA provision.
Furthermore, the fact that the NLRB must accommodate competing federal immigration law does not justify the exclusion of undocumented workers from the aegis of the NLRA. Adherents of the antinomy argument assert that the extension of NLRA protection to
these employees impedes the administration of our immigration laws
to an unacceptable degree. This contention, however, misunderstands
the measure of accommodation required of the Board in an area
under its statutorily mandated responsibility. While the Board must
strive to minimize interference with immigration law, it must nevertheless apply its own policy in determining the coverage and scope of
protection afforded undocumented workers under the NLRA.
The ingression of undocumented workers is a social phenomenon
of long historical standing. Their importance to critical economic
sectors strongly suggests this illegal circulation of labor will continue
as long as they remain legally vulnerable to exploitation. Consequently, labor law doctrine should recognize the legitimate right of
these workers to organize unions in order to improve abject working
conditions and dismally low wages. If the statutory protection of the
NLRA is extended to undocumented workers, then economic vulnerability can be minimized, thus potentially reducing the utilization of

these workers and improving the working conditions and wage-levels
of all workers.

